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In this thesis, I seek to explain Nietzsche political ideas by examining them 
together with his philosophy of morality. Nietzsche’s status as a political thinker is highly 
controversial. Some have considered him anti-political while others have argued that he 
is apolitical. Still others argue that his philosophy cannot be seen as bereft of political 
concerns. Those who see a political dimension to his philosophy are also in disagreement 
over his political position. He has been appropriated by ideological positions of all stripes 
despite obvious textual difficulty. My intention here is simply to explain his political 
ideas in light of this disagreement.  
I argue that Nietzsche is not a political thinker in the mould of Plato or Rousseau. 
Nevertheless, his philosophy has political implications that are of significant value. I 
approach his political thought as a diagnosis of modern society rather than as a 
prescription or remedy. This is prudent because he does not provide a detailed scheme or 
outline as to how his political goals are to be achieved. Studying his political commentary 
diagnostically allows us to understand the problems of modern politics in greater detail.  
I first begin this thesis by examining his moral philosophy. Nietzsche often 
describes modern politics as the offshoot of traditional morality. I begin by examining his 
genealogy of morality before proceeding to discuss his assault on Christian morality. I 
argue that he attacks morality because it removes the conditions necessary for both 
sublimation and the development of human excellence. I examine his discussion of pity 
in detail in order to explain his position. 
I then proceed to discuss his political ideas. I argue that Nietzsche is against 
democracy and liberalism for reasons similar to his attack on morality. In addition, 
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Nietzsche’s comments on politics are often ambiguous and contradictory. I make an 
















My approach to understanding Nietzsche is premised on Strong’s view that 
‘getting to know Nietzsche is a bit like getting to know a new town’ (Strong 1988, 4). 
Initial explorations are often fraught with ambiguity and can sometimes be rather 
intimidating. But as one comes to know the city, the frantic chaos subsides and a 
semblance of order begins to emerge. Similarly, Nietzsche’s writings might appear 
overwhelming at first, and this is perhaps intentional. But as one gets to know Nietzsche, 
the apparent obscurity of his work fades and his philosophy gradually becomes more 
intelligible.  
This approach implies that almost every attempt at getting to know Nietzsche is 
unique. If understanding Nietzsche is akin to coming to terms with a new city, then one 
will surely come to understand Nietzsche in his or her own way. But we should not infer, 
therefore, that the enterprise of understanding Nietzsche is an intellectual free-for-all 
where it is indeed possible to justify any reading of his work. One could certainly read 
Nietzsche as a fascist. But such a reading is neither historically accurate nor textually 
sound. A faithful appreciation of Nietzsche’s ideas requires one to come to terms with the 
depth, breadth and complexity of his thought. This involves engaging in a quasi-historical 
enterprise centered on an examination of Nietzsche’s own texts. Understanding Nietzsche 
comes with the acknowledgement that some ideas are clearly not authentically 
‘Nietzschean’.  
The aims of this thesis must be understood in the light of this approach. This 
thesis does not defend the idea that Nietzsche was primarily a political philosopher. 
Neither does it present Nietzsche as an ideological advocate of liberalism, fascism, 
socialism or nationalism. Nietzsche’s thought has too often been subjected to 
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questionable readings for exactly these purposes. Instead this thesis seeks to expose the 
grounds and presuppositions of his political ideas and to reveal the logic behind his 
political comments by examining their foundations and placing them within the wider 
context of his philosophy.  
This enterprise is important for at least two reasons. First, understanding the 
grounds of Nietzsche’s political ideas clarifies ongoing debates surrounding his political 
thought. Revealing their foundations limits the extent to which they can be abused, 
dismissed or over-emphasized. Establishing, for example, why Nietzsche assailed 
equality within the context of his other political ideas and overarching philosophy 
prevents us from dismissing it as merely the idiosyncrasy of an elitist. Furthermore, 
distorting the significance of his political commentary necessarily undermines the general 
cognizance of his philosophy. Understanding the foundations of his political views allows 
one to identify self-serving, ideologically tainted readings of Nietzsche and precludes 
them from passing as credible, authoritative interpretations of his work. 
Second, Nietzsche’s political ideas should be read as part of his diagnosis of the 
ills of modern society. Michael Oakeshott once wrote that ‘the mistake of the 
Nietzscheans and their opponents was a preoccupation with what was least significant in 
Nietzsche’s work, the remedies he proposed for the ills of European society. They saw in 
him an apostle of a New Aristocracy, the defender of the strong against the insidious 
mediocrity of the weak, the preacher of salvation through the pursuit of “more robust 
ideals”’ (Oakeshott 2007, 224). For Oakeshott, the significance of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy lay not in his remedies, but in his diagnosis of Europe’s cultural crisis 
(Oakeshott 2007, 224). 
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Following Oakeshott, I argue that the strength of Nietzsche’s philosophy lies in 
his diagnosis of the cultural deterioration of modern society and has little to do with his 
remedies. In fact, given that Nietzsche’s prescriptions are often stated in very general 
terms, I believe that it is prudent to read Nietzsche’s seemingly ‘prescriptive’ comments 
as an important element of his diagnosis. Although many are predisposed to reading 
Nietzsche’s praise of aristocracy, for instance, as a proposed solution to the ills of modern 
society, a proper reading would understand these statements as a significant part of 
Nietzsche’s attempt to clarify, explain and emphasize the importance of his diagnosis.  
I am suggesting that Nietzsche’s remarks on aristocracy are, perhaps, best taken 
as attempts at impressing upon his readers the damaging, deleterious and quite possibly 
species-threatening effects of Christian morality and democratic values. Philosophically 
expounding the efficacy of an aristocratic order does not immediately imply policy 
advocacy. Such a philosophy could simply aim at sharpening, clarifying and making 
more apparent the verities of a diagnosis largely expected to be received with skepticism 
and hostility. In short, Nietzsche’s aristocratic arguments are not practical proposals. 
Rather, they should be understood as contributions to his philosophical aim of diagnosing 
the ills of modern society.  
One obvious objection to such a reading is that it discounts a literal reading of 
Nietzsche’s texts. The argument here would be that by and large, Nietzsche means what 
he says and there are, generally speaking, no codes to decipher or hidden meanings to be 
revealed. When Nietzsche writes that an aristocratic order facilitates the development and 
flourishing of human excellence, an achievement that stands beyond the reach of any 
association imbued with a democratic, liberal or Christian culture, and that the continued 
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existence of humanity is dependent on this flourishing of human excellence, he is deadly 
serious. To free humanity from the possibility of extinction, our culture and social 
arrangements must change. Modern society must be transformed from a culture that 
cripples excellence through the leveling effects of ‘equality and sympathy’ to one that 
celebrates distinction. And because distinction reveals itself only in the few and not in the 
many, a culture of equality or a culture that embraces values that inhibit the development 
of excellence must be abrogated for the sake of humanity. To do otherwise would be to 
descend into a world bereft of creativity and excellence, a world inhabited by a figure 
whom Nietzsche disconcertingly calls the ‘last man’.  
Alas, the time of the most despicable man is coming, he that is no longer able to 
despise himself. Behold I show you the last man.  
No shepherd and one herd! Everybody wants the same, everybody is the same: 
whoever feels different goes voluntarily into a madhouse.  
(Z, Prologue 5)  
 
Despite the fact that Nietzsche does assert that an aristocratic order provides the 
conditions for the development of human excellence, I fail to see why a literal reading 
necessarily entails a prescriptive reading. It is entirely possible that by demonstrating how 
an aristocratic order supports human flourishing, Nietzsche is in fact clarifying why a 
democratic order cannot possibly fulfill the same role.  
The crucial point here is that this is still a literal reading that takes Nietzsche’s 
comments seriously. ‘Prescriptive’ readers must therefore establish why a literal reading 
of Nietzsche’s aristocratic comments must necessarily translate into policy initiatives that 
ought to be pursued, and not a philosophical enterprise that explains modern cultural ills 
by exposing democracy’s limitations. To put it differently, the question that must be 
addressed is why a literal reading cannot be understood as ‘theoretical clarification’ but 
must be taken to mean ‘practical guidance’ consisting of a call to action.  
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It is, of course, possible to ask the same of the non-prescriptive reader. That is, just 
as the prescriptive reader must establish why Nietzsche’s aristocratic comments must be 
read as remedies, the non-prescriptive reader must explain why it should not be read as 
such. But it is the prescriptive reader who should, I believe, first undertake the task of 
explaining their interpretive position. If Nietzsche does indeed view his aristocratic 
comments as social remedies, then one must account for the almost absurd lack of 
prescriptive detail in his writings. The specifics of how this cultural transformation is to 
be achieved or how this aristocratic order is to function are largely absent from his 
philosophy. In contrast, reading Nietzsche’s aristocratic comments as part of his diagnosis 
poses no such interpretive problem. In fact, this approach adds detail to Nietzsche’s 
diagnosis of modern culture. It is only after textual detail is provided in support of a 
‘remedial’ reading that any non-prescriptive reading must defend its interpretive stance. 
Nietzsche’s critique of morality makes clear the difficulty of reading his aristocratic 
comments prescriptively and it is therefore necessary to examine his comments on this 
issue. 
To determine Nietzsche’s status as a political thinker or conclude if his works fall 
under the category of political thought, one must first begin with a definition of the terms 
‘politics’ and ‘political thought’. It may be said that the emergence of political activity 
rests on the satisfaction of three conditions. The first is that there must be a ‘plurality of 
human beings’ living in association with one another. The second is that this association 
recognizes ‘some authority’ to be ‘the official custodian of the law of the association and 
the official director of the common affairs of the association’ (Oakeshott 2006, 42). Put 
simply, a government must exist for political activity to emerge. Third, ‘either the ruling 
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authority itself, or the common law of the association, or the public policy being pursued, 
or all these, must be understood by the members of the association to be capable of being 
determined by human deliberation and action’ (Oakeshott 2006, 42). These conditions are 
necessary for political activity to emerge because politics is ‘concerned with deciding 
between alternative courses of action and with instituting change’ (Oakeshott 2006, 42). 
It is ‘thinking about what should be done and persuading or inducing those who have the 
authority to act to make certain choices and not others’ (Oakeshott 2006, 42). Because 
political activity turns on the idea of deliberation, politics cannot come into existence 
without plurality (there would be no one to deliberate with), differences in opinion (there 
would be no need for deliberation under the conditions of unanimity, unless of course one 
understands ‘deliberation’ in the Rousseauean sense) or the possibility for human action 
to effect change (there would be no reason to deliberate if choice were absent). As 
Michael Oakeshott describes it, political activity is the ‘activity of governing and the 
experience of being governed’ (Oakeshott 1993, 16). 
From this understanding of political activity, political thought is defined as seeking 
‘the intellectual organization, the organization of ideas, arguments and methods of 
argument, of a political experience’ (Oakeshott 2006, 42). There are two fundamental 
modes of thinking within this tradition. The first is ‘practical political thought’. Its 
‘design is to diagnose political situations, to recommend responses to be made to them to 
choose and to decide what shall be done or to defend or justify in argument what has 
been done’. The second is ‘political theory’, or more precisely, ‘explanatory thinking’. 
‘Political theory’ is not concerned with the legislative processes of policy and law. 
Rather, it is concerned with explaining ‘political activity, either historically or 
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philosophically’ in order to make it ‘intelligible’. What then, should we make of a 
political philosopher? For Oakeshott,  
Every man, I suppose, has his political opinions, and sometimes they are opinions 
which will interest and inspire ages other than his own. But a political philosopher 
has something more, and more significant, than political opinions: he has an 
analysis of political activity, a comprehensive view of the nature of political life, 
and it is this, and not his political opinions, which it is profitable for a later and 
different age to study. (Oakeshott 2007, 111)   
 
With this view of political philosophy in mind, we will now proceed to examine the 




Underlying Nietzsche’s appropriation into the canon of western political 
philosophy (eg., Kariel 1963; Warren 1985; Woolfolk 1986; Strauss and Cropsey 1987; 
Strong 1988; Thiele 1991, 1994; Owen 1995; Conway 1997; Abbey and Appel 1999; 
Glenn 2001; Shaw 2007; Siemens and Roodt 2008) is an extensive dissimilarity of 
opinions concerning the significance and meaning of his political insights. For some, 
Nietzsche is to be understood as a philosopher and an ‘artist’ who was preoccupied with 
issues largely divorced from matters of political philosophy (eg., Kaufmann 1974). For 
others, his political comments play a crucial role in deciphering the complexities of his 
philosophy and must be taken seriously. These ideas cannot be dismissed or explained 
away as irrelevant, meaningless or madness without doing injury to a holistic 
understanding of his philosophy (eg., Ansell-Pearson 1994). Still others advocate that 
while it might be prudent to dismiss his political statements – principally because they are 
largely antagonistic to the common moral and political sensibilities of our present – it 
 9 
does not suggest that Nietzsche has little to contribute to the discussions and development 
of political philosophy (eg., Rorty 1989; Connolly 1991). His penetrating philosophical 
insights readily lend themselves to debates within this canon and help sharpen, refine and 
develop the manner of engaging and thinking about these debates. 
Nietzsche’s work, then, has been understood as anti-political, apolitical or 
incidentally political. The latter view holds that his philosophy does indeed have political 
implications and informs political thought even if it is not a work of political philosophy 
in itself. There is, of course, the alternative view that it would be an error to consider 
Nietzsche as anything other than a political thinker. On this view, any attempt to diminish 
the importance of Nietzsche’s political views will itself result in fallacy and error when 
attempting to make sense of his philosophy.  
Scholarly disagreement over Nietzsche’s political thought has not been confined 
to the issue of whether it is appropriate to consider Nietzsche a political philosopher, or 
his philosophy as political. Those who see a political element in Nietzsche disagree over 
the meaning of his political views. Furthermore, his grandiose literary style has frustrated 
many efforts to come to terms with the depth, breadth and complexity of his thought. The 
end result has been a welter of contradictory interpretations of his political orientation 
and ideals. As Bruce Detwiler describes it, Nietzsche has been seen as ‘a socialist, a 
social Darwinist, an opponent of social Darwinism, a German nationalist’ and ‘an 
opponent of all nationalism’ (Detwiler 1990, 1). More recently, he has also been 
associated with liberal constitutionalism (Kariel 1963), radical aristocraticism (Detwiler 
1990), anarchism (Bergmann 1987), Machiavellian politics (Dombowsky 2004), 
liberalism (Rorty 1989; Connolly 1991), democracy (Hatab 1995, 2002) and anti-
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democratic thinking (Appel 1999). If we consider morality as closely intertwined with 
political ideals, he has also been regarded as a perfect immoralist, a qualified immoralist 
and a moralist who grounds his moral philosophy on an aesthetic version of affirmation 
(see Foot 1994; Clark 1994).  
A careful reading of Nietzsche immediately demonstrates that some of these 
interpretations are extremely difficult to defend. In this thesis, I will argue that 
Nietzsche’s politics embraces an aristocratic elitism that is grounded on naturalism. 
Although Nietzsche does not reveal the inner workings of this aristocratic society, he 
does think that it will be ruled by a small elite of – to borrow Plato’s characterization – 
philosopher-rulers.   
Nietzsche calls these philosopher-rulers the Übermenschen, individuals who 
transcend the limitations of the social order and overcome the meaninglessness and 
nihilistic elements prevalent in modernity. They are able to break free from the shackles 
of commonality and conformity, and through the possession of this unique strength, 
challenge the impositions of conventional values largely defined by traditional morality. 
More importantly, these individuals are and must be philosophers or artists, for it is 
through their creative abilities that they will be able to rule for humanity’s enhancement 
(although this does not necessarily suggest that it will be beneficial for individuals). The 
myths of Christianity and democracy must be exposed if we are to recover from 
decadence and sickness.  
Although some commentators have remarked on Nietzsche’s affinity with 
aristocracy, I believe there is still more to be said. This thesis explains Nietzsche’s 
aristocratic politics by first examining its roots in his philosophy of morals and then by 
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comparing it with his conception of the failures and weaknesses of democracy, socialism 
and nationalism.  
 Even before Nietzsche’s political thought had been closely associated with fascism 
and its military campaigns, his philosophy was already connected with war. In France, 
the United States, and especially Britain, Nietzsche was held responsible for the outbreak 
of the First World War (Thomas 1984, 1; Aschheim 1992, 128; Mackintire 1917, 357-
379). A London bookseller had labeled it the ‘Euro-Nietzschean War’ shortly after it 
begun and there was ‘widespread conviction of Germany’s enemies that this thinker was 
somehow directly responsible for its outbreak and especially brutal conduct’ (Aschheim 
1992, 128). Although Nietzsche’s reputation had been sullied then, it was only after the 
Second World War that his infamy hardened into dogma. At the request of his self-
serving sister, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, Adolf Hitler visited the Nietzsche archives at 
Weimar; a visit which resulted in the ‘much publicized photograph’ of ‘Hitler gazing 
with respectful solemnity at Nietzsche’s bust’ (Thomas 1984, 1). And this photograph 
was captioned, ‘The Führer before the bust of the German philosopher whose ideas have 
fertilized two great popular movements: the National Socialism of Germany and the 
Fascist movement of Italy’ (Golomb and Wistrich 2002, 1).  
 Nietzsche’s writings were widely recognized to have contributed to the 
philosophical justification of the Nazi project. Although arguing Nietzsche was not 
himself a fascist, Crane Brinton suggests, for example, that ‘scattered through Nietzsche's 
work is a good deal of material suitable for anti-Semitic use’ and that ‘most of the stock 
of professional anti-Semitism is represented in Nietzsche’ (Brinton 1941, 215). In a 
similar vein, Arthur Danto argues that ‘it would have exacted a measure of subtlety 
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utterly unreasonable to demand from his [Nietzsche’s] readers that they see in this 
anything but ascription of blame to the Jews for the evils of the modern world. If he was 
not an anti-Semite, his language is misleading to a point of irresponsibility’ (Danto 1965, 
166-167).  
Although it is now generally agreed upon that Nietzsche’s philosophy was 
misappropriated by some of the ‘intellectual’ members of the Third Reich - Richard 
Oehler, Alfred Baumler, Alfred Rosenberg and Heinrich Hartle, to name a few – Danto’s 
critique of Nietzsche’s style lends itself to condoning such extreme and misguided 
readings of Nietzsche. However misguided, these authors believed that Nietzsche’s 
thought was deeply political. Richard Oehler, for example, believed Nietzsche’s writings 
reflected a proud German nationalist (Detwiler 1990, 1, 199) while Alfred Baeumler 
considered Nietzsche to be a ‘politician’ whose ‘philosophy of the will to power is the 
philosophy of politics’ (Baeumler 2003, 99). 
Yet to blame Nietzsche for one’s private turn to Nazism is simply to admit that 
one has read Nietzsche selectively and entirely out of context. As Ansell-Pearson 
remarks, while ‘Nietzsche’s advocacy of elitism and cruelty as a means of achieving 
political ends, as well as his break with the past and his assault on a Christian ethics of 
compassion, lends itself … to a Fascist reading … there are many things in Nietzsche 
which are anathema to a Fascist politics, including his opposition to nationalism, his pan-
Europeanism, his commitment to culture over politics, and his attack on the modern 
bureaucratic state for stifling its creativity and individuality’ (Ansell-Pearson 1994, 33). 
Drawing on George Bataille’s assertion that Nietzsche subordinated all else to culture, 
Ansell-Pearson continues that ‘the real problem with the labeling of Nietzsche as a 
 13 
Fascist, or worse, a Nazi, is that it ignores the fact that Nietzsche’s aristocratism seeks to 
revive an older conception of politics, one which he locates in the Greek agon’ (Ansell-
Pearson 1994, 33).  
Although German nationalists saw in Nietzsche a deeply political philosopher, 
Walter Kauffmann contends that Nietzsche’s philosophy remains largely detached from 
political concerns. Rescuing Nietzsche from the haunting spectre of Nazism with his 
groundbreaking work Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, Kaufmann argues 
that Nietzsche’s real concern lay with the idea of individual creation (Kaufmann 1974). 
He writes that ‘the leitmotif of Nietzsche’s life and thought’ was fundamentally ‘the 
theme of the antipolitical individual who seeks self-perfection far from the modern 
world’ (Kaufmann 1974, 418). Kaufmann’s point is not simply that any fascist reading of 
Nietzsche is misguided; rather, he asserts that any political reading of Nietzsche must 
necessarily be mistaken. Indeed, there are passages in Nietzsche’s corpus that support 
Kaufmann’s reading.   
In Schopenhauer as Educator, Nietzsche writes that ‘every philosophy which 
believes that the problem of existence is touched on, not to say solved, by a political 
event is a joke and a pseudo philosophy … we are experiencing the consequences of the 
doctrine, lately preached from all the rooftops, that the state is the highest goal of 
mankind and that a man has no higher duty than to serve the state, in which doctrine I 
recognize a relapse not into paganism but into stupidity’ (SE 4). In the Twilight of the 
Idols, Nietzsche emphatically asserts that ‘all great ages of culture are ages of political 
decline: what is great culturally has always been unpolitical, even antipolitical’ (TI, 
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Germans 4). Perhaps the clearest indication of Nietzsche’s antipolitical attitude lies in his 
assertion that he is the ‘last antipolitical German’ (EH, Wise, 3). 
Although these passages demonstrate Nietzsche’s hostility to politics, many other 
remarks in his work suggest that politics is necessary. In an unpublished work titled The 
Greek State, Nietzsche writes that ‘we must, however, construe the Greeks, in relation to 
the unique zenith of their art, as being a priori “political men par excellence”; and 
actually history knows of no other example of such an awesome release of the political 
urge, of such a complete sacrifice of all other interests in the service of this instinct 
towards the state – at best, we could honour the men of the Renaissance in Italy with the 
same title, by way of comparison and for similar reasons’ (TGS, 182).  
This passage suggests that Nietzsche views the state as a necessary means for the 
development of culture. It is only through the kind of enthusiasm for the state that the 
Greeks displayed that a hierarchical order can be established. This hierarchy is necessary 
precisely because the artist – in order to carry out his task as an artist – simply cannot 
afford the time to grapple with the mundane and alienating circumstances and conditions 
of labour that existence demands. ‘In order for there to be a broad, deep, fertile soil for 
the development of art, the overwhelming majority has to be slavishly subjected to life’s 
necessity in the service of the minority, beyond the measure that is necessary for the 
individual’ (TGS, 178). And this production of “surplus value” for the elite is necessary 
because ‘we do not feel it is possible for man, fighting for sheer survival, to be an artist’ 
(TGS, 177).  
It is only when members of a political community are willing to sacrifice 
themselves for the ideal of the state that culture can flourish.  Although the very 
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establishment of states results in concentration of the ‘urge of bellum omnium contra 
omnes’ into ‘dreadful clouds of war between nations, in ‘the intervals, the concentrated 
effect of that bellum, turned inwards, gives society time to germinate and turn green 
everywhere, so that it can let the radiant blossoms of genius sprout forth as soon as 
warmer days come’ (TGS, 182). For Nietzsche, the assertion that ‘slavery belongs to the 
essence of a culture’ must be heard, even if it is heard as a ‘cruel-sounding truth’ (TGS, 
178). 
This passage, written even before The Birth of Tragedy, contains within it ideas 
regarding the relationship between culture, politics and the nature of the political order 
that are found in Nietzsche’s later works. This demonstrates either a striking continuity or 
eventual return to the fundamental elements of Nietzsche’s political ideas. Here, it is 
clear that Nietzsche does not entirely reject the state or politics in its entirety, but clearly 
rejects politics as an end in itself and certain types of political order that apparently stifle 
the development of culture and the justification of civilizations. As Nietzsche writes in 
Beyond Good and Evil, ‘every enhancement of the type “man” has so far been the work 
of an aristocratic society – and it will be so again and again – a society that believes in 
the long ladder of an order of rank and differences in value between man and man, and 
that needs slavery in some sense or other’ (BGE 257). 
This suggests that Kaufmann’s reading of Nietzsche as antipolitical is selective. 
Indeed, Fredrick Appel goes so far as to argue that despite providing us ‘with a valuable 
corrective’ against Nazism’s appropriation of Nietzsche’s philosophy, Kaufmann’s desire 
‘to bring his subject into line with prevailing liberal sensibilities’ ironically mirrored that 
of Nietzsche’s sister.’ Appel goes on to say, almost too harshly, that ‘Kaufmann’s 
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Nietzsche, a heroic figure aligned with other luminaries of the Western canon such as 
Socrates, Christ, and the Enlightenment philosophes, turned out to be scarcely more 
accurate a depiction than the Nazi’s Aryan version (albeit from a much more palatable 
perspective)’ (Appel 1999, 9). It is almost as if Kaufmann felt the need to totally distance 
Nietzsche from the realm of politics if he were to stand any chance of restoring Nietzsche 
to respectability.  
Conversely, there are those who seek to demonstrate the pertinence of reading 
Nietzsche as a political philosopher. Ansell-Pearson advances such an understanding of 
Nietzsche when he writes that ‘Nietzsche is a thinker preoccupied with the fate of politics 
in the modern world. One has only to take a glance at his wide-ranging concerns – from 
his early reflections on the Greek agon to his attempt to write a genealogy of morality and 
his diagnosis of nihilism to characterise the moral malaise and sickness of modern human 
beings – to realize that Nietzsche is a ‘political’ thinker first and foremost’ (Ansell-
Pearson 1994, 33). Similarly, Don Dombowsky states that ‘Nietzsche does have a 
political theory, a theory of what politics is and what it should be (which makes 
inequality the condition for the production of the exemplary type). He is antipolitical, 
strictly speaking, because he does not foresee the end of violence. If there is a problem 
with this theory, it is not a problem of consistency or contradiction, bur rather a problem 
of insufficient detail and a style that tends towards propaganda rather than argument’ 
(Dombowsky 2004, 1). 
Brian Leiter, however, challenges the position that Nietzsche does indeed have a 
political philosophy. According to Leiter, ‘the interpretive question … is whether 
scattered remarks and parenthetical outbursts add up to systematic views on questions of 
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philosophical significance. Unfortunately, scholarly caution has not been the hallmark of 
the revival of interest in Nietzsche's political philosophy’ (Leiter 2007). Leiter insists that 
Nietzsche has no political philosophy, although this does not mean that the German 
philosopher has nothing to add to political literature or thought. Rather, Nietzsche’s 
philosophical ideas, like his assault on morality, contain within them deep political 
implications that bring politics into his thought only through an extended relationship.  
In Nietzsche we find no evidence to conclude that he was a political philosopher in 
the same sense as Rousseau, Hobbes, Locke or even Kant (Leiter 2007). These thinkers 
have ‘philosophical views about political questions — the state, liberty, law, justice, etc. 
— [they are] not thinkers whose views about other topics merely had “implications” for 
politics’ (Ibid.). Martha Nussbaum, who makes the exceptional assertion that ‘Nietzsche 
claimed to be a political thinker, indeed an important political thinker’ (Nussbaum 1995, 
1) is vehemently challenged by Leiter to provide ‘textual evidence’ to support her claim.
1
 
In Nussbaum’s defense, she probably had this passage in mind.  
I am the bearer of glad tidings as no one ever was before … when truth comes into 
conflict with the lies of millennia there will be tremors, a ripple of earthquakes, an 
upheaval of mountains and valleys such as no one has ever imagined. The concept 
of politics will have then merged entirely into a war of spirits, all power structures 
from the old society will have exploded – they are all based on lies: there will be 
wars such as the earth has never seen. Starting with me, the earth will know great 
politics. (EH Destiny, 1) 
 
Nussbaum claims that the ‘tidings’ Nietzsche speaks of are political, but Leiter argues 
that ‘Nietzsche does not say that “tidings” are political; indeed, as the earlier discussion 
of his critique of morality shows, the “tidings are directed only at select readers, nascent 
higher human beings, for whom morality is harmful’ (Leiter 2007). He goes on to 
                                                
1
 In this and what follows, I present Leiter’s arguments as he stated and developed them. I do so in order to 
respond afterwards. One should also note that Nussbaum only claims that Nietzsche regarded himself as a 
great political thinker. She does not think that he qualifies as one and argues that in her paper.  
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conclude that the philosopher’s claim of ‘great politics’ does as ‘little to establish that he 
has a political philosophy as the claim, in the very same passage, that Nietzsche’s “glad 
tidings” will cause “upheavals, a convulsion of earthquakes, a mobbing of mountains and 
valleys” does to establish that he has a geological theory’ (Leiter 2007).  
Leiter argues that ‘those who claim to find a political philosophy in Nietzsche 
typically rely on a handful of passages — most often, sections 56-57 of The Antichrist — 
as the slender evidence on the basis of which elaborate views about the ideal forms of 
social and political organization are attributed to Nietzsche’ (Leiter 2007). Citing Thomas 
Brobjer, Leiter insists that this passage in clearly unable to ‘withstand much scrutiny’ if it 
is read within the proper context. In the quote cited by Leiter, Brobjer argues that 
‘[Nietzsche's] purpose [in these passages in The Antichrist] is to make the contrast with 
Christianity as strong as possible … to make the reader “realize” that even the laws of 
Manu… is higher and more humane than Christianity. Whereas Christianity destroys, the 
intention at least of the laws of Manu was to save and protect’ (Brobjer 1998, 312-313). 
Leiter then goes on to argue that ‘the rhetorical context of the passage is crucial, 
though it is completely ignored by all those commentators bent on inventing a 
Nietzschean political philosophy. Indeed, the passage quoted above from A 57 is 
specifically introduced to illustrate the use of the “holy lie” (the lie being, in this case, the 
claim that “nature, not Manu” distinguishes the castes). And as even the title of the book 
would suggest, Nietzsche's target is Christianity, and the laws of Manu are invoked 
simply to drive home that point’ (Leiter 2007). 
Leiter’s argument here is problematic. What is most striking about his criticism is 
his own failure to read the text carefully despite leveling this same condemnation on 
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other scholars commenting on Nietzsche. If the text is read carefully, it becomes 
immediately apparent that Nietzsche is not predicating his society on Manu’s caste 
system. Rather, Nietzsche uses Manu’s caste system merely as an example to 
demonstrate that the idea of a caste or hierarchical social ordering is not inherently bad, 
for it provides the opportunity for human development and progress. Nietzsche is not 
arguing for the implementation of Manu’s caste system, but an implementation of a social 
caste order that is demanded by nature. That he writes ‘Nature, not Manu, separates out 
predominantly spiritual people from people characterized by muscular and 
temperamental strength’ should be sufficient to show that Nietzsche does indeed praise a 
hierarchical social order that, according to the philosopher, is advocated by nature. He 
also writes that ‘to prepare a book of law in the style of Manu means to give a people the 
right to become master one day, to become perfect’ (AC 57).  
Leiter’s other criticism – that interpreters refer only to a few fragments, namely 
aphorism 57 in the Antichrist to build Nietzsche’s political philosophy – is also too 
dismissive. While it is true that interpreters do rely on that particular aphorism, there are 
many other instances where Nietzsche speaks of politics in an informative manner. For 
example, his comments on the failings of democracy, socialism and the strengths of 
aristocracy are clearly spelt out in other works like Beyond Good and Evil and Human all 
too Human. And as my chapter on politics will show, Nietzsche’s comments on politics 
are far more extensive than Leiter asserts it to be.  Furthermore, his constant references to 
higher types and discussions of higher culture can also be brought into his political 
discourse, for as we have seen, he thinks that an aristocratic social order is the ideal. He 
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also discusses the importance of religion as a political instrument to ensure the smooth 
continuation of an aristocratic order.  
Yet Leiter’s oversights do not, in my opinion, fundamentally weaken his case that 
Nietzsche has no political philosophy. I believe that it is difficult to deny that Nietzsche’s 
political ideas are not as developed as those of Rousseau, Hobbes, Locke or Kant, and in 
no way constitute a ‘political philosophy’ as the term is traditionally understood. Of 
course, it is easy to find authors prepared to contradict this view. Appel writes that ‘it is 
often noted, rightly, that Nietzsche abhors strict blueprints and does not provide us with a 
draft constitution for a new society ruled by Ubermenschen. If one believes that the 
appellation “political philosopher” ought to be reserved exclusively for those with such 
blueprints in hand, he clearly would not fit the bill’. But he adds that ‘to hold this view is 
to opt for an exceedingly narrow conception of political philosophy. Under such rigid 
criteria even Plato would find his credentials as a political philosopher called into 
question, for his Republic contains no such nuts-and-bolts analysis’ (Appel 1999, 15).  
Perhaps, ultimately, whether or not we choose to confer the label of political 
philosopher on Nietzsche is not such an important issue. As we shall see, despite the 
unsystematic character of his thought on politics, there are nevertheless certain distinctive 
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The overcoming of morality – even the self-overcoming of 
morality, in a certain sense: let this be the name for that long 
and secret labour which is reserved for the most subtle, 
genuinely honest, and also the most malicious consciences of 
the day, who are living touchstones of the soul. 
– Friedrich Nietzsche 
 
Those who find ugly meanings in beautiful things are corrupt 
without being charming. This is a fault. Those who find 
beautiful meanings in beautiful things are the cultivated. For 
these there is hope. They are the elect to whom beautiful 
things mean only Beauty. There is no such thing as a moral or 
an immoral book. Books are well written, or badly written. 
That is all. 
 
 –      Oscar Wilde 
 
The Question of Genealogy 
 
Nietzsche’s study of morality is ‘genealogical’. According to Foucault, genealogy 
is an approach that is ‘gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary.’ It ‘operates on a 
field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over 
and recopied many times’ (Foucault 1977, 139). It is sensitive to linguistic 
transformations and revisions in the meaning of words, and cautiously avoids imposing 
linearity or unity on the past. Although it denies teleology, progressive views of history 
and the search for origins, genealogy does not ‘neglect as inaccessible the vicissitudes of 
history.’ Instead it cultivates ‘the details and accidents that accompany every beginning’ 
and is ‘scrupulously attentive to their petty malice’ (Foucault 1977, 144).   
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Foucault replaces the term ‘origins’ with ‘beginnings’, thereby distinguishing the 
genealogical approach from other attitudes to the past.
2
 Genealogy understands 
‘beginnings’ as accidental, diverse and conflicting. It allows for a more robust account of 
the emergence of present identities by acknowledging their mutability over time. 
Projecting contemporary valuations into the past forecloses historical possibilities as 
emendations and modifications to identities are dismissed. Genealogy traces the past of 
present identities; it does not search the past for them (Brown 2001, 102). 
In tracing the past of present identities, the genealogical approach focuses on 
descent rather than development. In contrast to the philosophies of Hegel, Comte and 
Spencer, all of which regard the ‘historicity of ideas’ as ‘phases of a predetermined 
metaphysical process’ (O’Sullivan 2009, 57), genealogy trades a progressive 
understanding of historical development for contingency and accident. The teleological 
march towards an end or purpose is disavowed, revealing ‘how contingently’ the 
apparently ineluctable facts of history ‘came into being and remains in being, [and] the 
degree to which’ they are ‘neither foreordained nor fixed in meaning’ (Brown 2001, 103). 
Genealogy does not tell the story of how the present is a necessary outcome of sequential 
events but sees it as the product of ‘an unstable assemblage of faults, fissures, and 
heterogeneous layers that threaten the fragile inheritor from within or from underneath’ 
(Foucault 1977, 146).  
Implicit in this understanding of genealogy is the somewhat paradoxical 
displacement of strict linearity from an historical account of the present. Genealogy, as 
Foucault describes it, does not ‘go back in time to restore an unbroken continuity that 
                                                
2
 See for example (WS 3). 
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operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten things’ and has no obligation to show that 
‘the past actively exists in the present’. It breaches the conceptual integrity of ‘evolution’ 
and ‘destiny’ by identifying the ‘accidents, the minute deviations – or conversely, the 
complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave 
birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us’ (Foucault 1977, 146). 
The present is the result of a complex interplay of diverse occurrences that emphasizes 
not only continuity but also contingency and discontinuity.  
An important aspect of genealogy is that it ‘permits an examination of our 
condition that calls into question the very terms of its construction’ (Brown 2001, 95). 
Contemporary meanings and identities organize our views of the present and facilitate 
our understanding of the past. They are often employed uncritically in our efforts to 
understand. By tracing the past of present identities and meanings, however, genealogy 
historicizes these identities and subjects them to scrutiny. It ‘exposes the power of the 
terms by which we live; it does violence to their ordinary ordering and situation, and 
hence to their givenness’. And in ‘dislocating that which is both its starting point and its 
object, the present, genealogy also dislocates by refiguring the terms of politics, morality, 
and even epistemology constitutive of the present’ (Brown 2001, 95).  
Raymond Geuss illuminates the genealogical method by contrasting it with what 
is called the ‘tracing [of] a pedigree’ (Geuss 2001, 322). Pursued with the intention to 
valorize an item, pedigree advances ‘from a singular origin which is an actual source of 
that value’ and ‘traces an unbroken line of succession from the origin to that item by a 
series of steps that preserve or enhance whatever value is in question’ (Geuss 2001, 324). 
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For Geuss, Nietzsche’s genealogy is entirely dissimilar to pedigree. It proceeds without 
valorizing and does not retrieve distinct origins.  
Because the present value we accord to a subject is not stretched into the past, 
genealogy does not guarantee a corresponding endorsement of the subject’s beginnings. 
The difference between genealogy and pedigree lies precisely in the latter’s assumption 
that value is enhanced – or at least preserved – throughout history. This understanding of 
genealogy in methodological terms enables us to approach Nietzsche’s critique of 
morality with greater clarity and it is to this critique that I shall now turn. 
 
On the Genealogy of [Christian] Morality 
 
Nietzsche reveals in the preface to On The Genealogy of Morality that his interest 
in the origin of moral prejudice commenced at an early age. Prompted partly by a 
Christian outlook, his initial search for the origin of evil ‘quite properly gave God credit 
for it and made him the father of evil’.3 But as his philosophy developed, Nietzsche 
found metaphysical and theological claims of other-worldliness specious and eventually 
discontinued his search for evil’s origin ‘beyond the world’ (GM P, 3). Instruction in 
history and philosophy coupled with an ‘innate fastidiousness with regard to all 
psychological problems’ gradually re-directed his concerns to the conditions out of which 
the inventions of moral prejudices developed and the intrinsic value of such prejudices 
(GM P, 3, 5, 6). This examination of the ‘value of these values’ requires knowledge 
‘about the conditions and circumstances under which the values grew up, developed and 
                                                
3
 Presumably, if God is the creator of all things, (s)he must be the origin of evil. According to Nietzsche, 
this attempt at theorizing the foundations of evil took place when he was thirteen. 
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changed … since we have neither had this knowledge up till now nor even desired it’ 
(GM P, 6). The Genealogy of Morality represents Nietzsche’s attempt to discover and 
account for these conditions. 
Conventional accounts describing the emergence of moral prejudice suggest that 
unegoistic deeds were designated ‘good’ by their recipients. ‘Good’ described acts of 
received utility and benefit. Over time, however, the impression of utility faded from 
memory as the commendation of these acts became routine. People started to 
‘experience’ these acts ‘as good – as if they were something good as such’ (GM I, 2). 
But this, according to Nietzsche, is a mistake. Tracing the etymology of ‘good’ in 
different languages, he concludes that it was simply a term aristocrats and noblemen 
employed to describe themselves. Individuals lacking the qualities of aristocrats – the 
weak, the low, the herd, the plebeian, the slave or the simple commoner – were referred 
to as ‘bad’ (schlecht).4 ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ were fundamentally non-moral designations 
describing both the social standing of and characteristics displayed by the aristocrat and 
commoner respectively. In an interesting aside, Nietzsche remarks that the ‘obstructing 
influence which the democratic bias within the modern world exercises over all questions 
of descent’ must have delayed the discovery of this ‘essential insight into moral 
genealogy’ (GM I, 4).  
An aristocratic value-judgment is grounded ‘on a powerful physicality, a 
blossoming, rich, even effervescent good health which includes the things needed to 
maintain it, war, adventure, hunting, dancing, jousting and everything else that contains 
                                                
4
 As Nietzsche writes, ‘it has been ‘the good’ themselves, meaning the noble, the mighty, the high-placed 
and the high-minded, who saw and judged themselves and their actions as good, I mean first-rate, in 
contrast to everything lowly, low-minded, common and plebian. It was from this pathos of distance that 
they first claimed the right to create values and give these values names’ (GM I, 2)!
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strong, free, happy action’ (GM I, 7). It issues from and describes conditions of strength. 
Within this framework, the non-aristocrat is one who possesses none of these traits. He is 
identified as weak and powerless – an individual who is unable to exert himself 
meaningfully through action. This non-moral designation of value was, however, 
eventually reversed and transformed into a moral evaluation by the weak. Frustrated by 
their inherent powerlessness and resentful of their condition, they engaged in a ‘radical 
revaluation of’ aristocratic values – ‘an act of the most deliberate revenge [durch einen 
Akt der geistigsten Rache]’ (GM I, 7; see also BGE 260).  
The revaluation of an adversary’s values is, perhaps, the greatest (and most 
insidious) form of revenge. It redefines ‘identity’ by altering the value of its constitutive 
characteristics. The transformation of noble qualities into characteristics symbolizing 
defectiveness and criminality subverts the aristocrat’s self-understanding and 
compensates for weakness by stripping away the value of these attributes. This slave 
revolt, Nietzsche points out, ‘occurs when ressentiment itself turns creative and gives 
birth to values’. Contrary to noble morality which emerges from self-affirmation, slave 
morality develops out of a denial ‘of everything that is ‘outside’, ‘other’, ‘non-self’: and 
this ‘no’ is its creative deed’ (GM I, 10; see also BGE 195; AC 24).  
Nietzsche emphasizes this distinction between the emergence of master and slave 
moralities. An aristocratic valuation grows out of strength, initially conceived in terms of 
pure physicality and social standing although gradually giving way to non-physical 
formulations like character and spirit. It is an independent affirmation of one’s own 
physiological characteristics that does not first require a denigration of everything 
without. Through this positive introspective assessment, one recognizes one’s qualities to 
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be ‘good’, that is, valuable. The designation ‘bad’ is merely an afterthought, a ‘pale 
contrast created after the event compared to its positive basic concept (GM I, 10 
Emphasis added). ‘The noble man’, Nietzsche remarks, ‘conceives of the basic idea 
‘good’ by himself, in advance and spontaneously, and only then creates a notion of 
‘bad’!’ (GM I, 11)  
Unlike aristocratic valuations, however, slave morality is reactive. It first requires 
an ‘opposing, external world … in order to act at all’ and looks to its enemies before 
affirming itself (GM I, 10). In the revaluation of values, the distinction between ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ is replaced by a moral distinction between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ (böse). Within this 
new normative framework, noble qualities are marked out as ‘evil’ as the ‘noble, 
powerful, dominating man’ is ‘re-touched, re-interpreted and re-viewed through the 
poisonous eye of ressentiment’ (GM I, 11). It is only after the creative responses of 
ressentiment emerge that the weak are able to establish their infirmities as valuable and 
hence ‘good’.  
Nietzsche’s insights into the development of morality raise questions about the 
exegetical account provided here. I have suggested that aristocratic valuations develop 
out of non-moral notions of strength. Conceived in purely physical terms, quantitative 
determinations of strength seem relatively unproblematic. Other categories of 
comparison, like wealth or ancestry, may also be utilized to differentiate the noble from 
the plebeian without moral complication. When Nietzsche goes beyond these distinctions 
to suggest that character traits are distinguishable through similar non-moral valuations, 
however, he appears to stray into the realm of moral judgment. His contention, for 
example, that the noble, led by the Greek aristocrats, referred to themselves as ‘the 
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truthful … in contrast to the deceitful common man’ appears at first glance to be a moral 
valuation (GM I, 5; BGE 260). Furthermore, the interpretation that aristocratic valuation 
is non-moral seems to contradict textual evidence given that Nietzsche refers to it as the 
‘first type of morality’ (BGE 260) and makes references to master and slave moralities 
(HAH I, 45; BGE 260). 
This said, understanding aristocratic valuation as ‘non-moral’ makes sense when 
one contrasts the approaches of master and slave moralities but nevertheless 
acknowledges traditional understandings of morality (ie. Judeo-Christian tradition) to be 
the standard of moral valuation. It is crucial that one stands outside both discourses with a 
view to contrasting them and avoids criticizing one discourse from within the other. From 
this standpoint, an aristocratic valuation which judges on the basis of strength is non-
moral. To say that a person is ‘good’ because of his strength, wealth or noble ancestry is 
not the same as saying that he is ‘morally good’. Likewise, one is not ‘morally bad’ 
because of weakness, poverty or humble lineage. Arthur Danto illustrates this point: 
From the masters’ perspective, those unlike themselves are merely bad humans; that 
is to say, humans that do not come up to the mark. This is similar to the way bad 
eggs are low in the scale of egghood. There is nothing morally bad in being a bad 
egg, or, in this usage, a bad human. It is just the way one is. Too bad, then, for the 
bad. They hardly can be blamed for being what they are; but they are bad. (Danto 
1965, 159)  
 
What is unclear in Danto’s statement is that this conclusion is reached by contrasting both 
discourses from without while accepting traditional accounts of morality as providing the 
definitive standards for moral evaluation. If one understands the aristocratic distinction 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ to be a moral discourse, the ‘bad’ person (or ‘bad’ egg) will be 
morally bad, although this “immorality” will differ from traditional assertions of moral 
failure. Contrasted with and accepting the discourse of ‘good and evil’ as constitutive of 
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“true” moral criterion, master morality can be said to be non-moral. It is not immoral 
because this contrast is pursued from without. Master morality may be said to be immoral 
only when viewed from within the discourse of traditional morality.
5
 
In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche asks if ‘we immoralists’ should not be 
‘standing on the threshold of a period that would be designated, negatively at first, as 
extra-moral’ as he contemplates the revaluation of values and distinguishes between pre-
moral, moral, and extra-moral periods in history (BGE 32, Emphasis added). This 
statement makes three important but related points. First, it indicates that the term ‘extra-
moral’ contains a negative evaluation of the forthcoming period. Nietzsche wants to 
show, I think, that although it is not premised on traditional moral valuations, this coming 
era should still be viewed positively and morally. Second, Nietzsche indicates that such a 
designation is only temporary. It will, at first, be known as ‘extra-moral’ but this 
designation will, it seems, eventually give way to the more appropriate label of ‘moral’. 
Third, it demonstrates Nietzsche’s acknowledgement of traditional moral discourse as the 
standard account of morality.
6
  
The preceding statement also reveals the challenge Nietzsche faces. On the one 
hand, he wants to redefine our values such that (some of) what currently passes for 
‘extra-moral’ (or ‘immoral’) will be regarded as moral. On the other hand, he needs to 
communicate the differences between these types of valuations. Aristocratic valuations 
are not ‘moral’ in the traditional sense. But traditional morality does not exhaust the 
                                                
5
 Similarly, slave morality, when viewed from within the discourse of master morality, may be ‘bad’ or 
morally wrong. But it is “morally bad” neither for the same reasons nor in the same way as a traditional 
valuation of moral failure. In addition, I do not mean to say that master morality will be immoral when 
critiqued from within traditional moral discourse. I leave the possibility open, however, as Nietzsche 
proclaims in Zur Genealogie der Moral that the weak viewed the strong and powerful as evil. In the same 
way, traditional morality may be considered ‘bad’ and hence ‘immoral’ when viewed from within 
aristocratic valuations. 
6
 Hence ‘pre’ and ‘extra’ moral. 
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possibilities of moral valuation. Describing aristocratic valuations as non-moral 
communicates its differences with traditional moral understanding but succumbs to its 
narrative. Describing them both as ‘morality’ obscures the point he means to 
communicate.  
Nevertheless it makes sense to regard aristocratic valuations as non-moral if one’s 
concern is to explain Nietzsche’s position. Standing within either discourse makes this 
difficult. And refusing to accept traditional moral discourse as the standard of morality 
will obscure attempts to highlight the distinctive nature of aristocratic valuation. This 
does not resolve, however, the apparent moral undertones of the aristocratic claim to 
truthfulness. But like Schopenhauer before him, Nietzsche recognizes the noble valuation 
of truthfulness as one defined in terms of strength and courage (Clark 1994, 24-25). In 
Über die Grundlage der Moral, Schopenhauer writes that: 
According to the code of knightly honour, the reproach of being a liar is of 
extreme gravity … not because the lie is wrong in itself, since, were such the 
reason, to accuse a man of an injury done by violence would certainly be regarded 
as equally outrageous … but it is due to that principle of chivalry, which in reality 
bases right on might; so that whoever, when trying to work mischief, has recourse 
to falsehood, proves that he lacks either power, or the requisite courage. Every 
untruth bears witness of his fear; and this is why a fatal verdict is passed on him. 




Aristocratic distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ remain non-moral even ‘within the 





                                                
7
 I am indebted to Clark for this point. See (Clark 1994, 24-25) 
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Jesus, Paul and Christianity 
 
Tracing back the emergence of ‘good and evil’ to resentful beginnings, Nietzsche 
believes that ‘nothing which has been done on earth against ‘the noble’, ‘the mighty’, ‘the 
masters’ and ‘the rulers’, is worth mentioning compared with what the Jews have done 
against them’ (GM I, 7). The Jews had ‘ventured, with awe-inspiring consistency, to 
bring about a reversal’ in the ‘aristocratic value equation’
8
 and succeeded with stunning 
adroitness (GM I, 7-8). The slave revolt in morality may have begun with the Jews (BGE 
195) but Christianity supplied its ‘triumphant crown … pursuing the aims of that [Jewish] 
hatred, victory, spoils, seduction with the same urgency with which the roots of that 
hatred were burrowing ever more thoroughly and greedily into everything that was deep 
and evil’ (GM I, 8). 
Nietzsche points out that the love often associated with Christianity grew out of, 
not against, this Jewish ‘thirst for revenge’ (GM I, 8; AC 24). But Christianity is not 
simply the coronel of Jewish vengeance, and Nietzsche’s understanding of it is far more 
complex than a rejection of its spiritual and practical doctrines. 
Most religions are founded by establishing ‘a certain way of life and everyday 
customs that work as a disciplina voluntatis … and then to give just this life an 
interpretation that makes it appear illuminated by the highest worth’ (GS 353). As a 
result of this interpretation, practices are transformed into a ‘good’ one willingly defends, 
occasionally culminating in sacrifice. It is important to point out, however, that Nietzsche 
regards the interpretation of practices as of greater importance than the practices 
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 Good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = blessed (GM I, 7)!
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themselves. This is because the practices an interpretation transforms are ‘usually already 
in place, though alongside other ways of life and without any consciousness of it special 
worth’. The hallmark of the religious founder lies in his or her ability to identify and 
choose a particular way of life for interpretation, in ‘guessing for the first time what it can 
be used for and how it can be interpreted’ (GS 353).  
In Nietzsche’s understanding, Christianity consists of a set of nondescript 
practices, customs and behavioral patterns whose meaning is transformed through 
interpretation and re-interpretation (Geuss 2001).
9
 Initially Jesus discovered and 
explained the ‘humble, virtuous, depressed life’ of the ‘small people in the Roman 
province’ and in doing so placed the ‘highest meaning and value into it’ (GS 353). But 
what was unique about his interpretation was that he did not extract and codify a set of 
principles from the observed customs. Jesus lived it instead. 
Because Jesus lived his interpretation, his life itself became the embodiment of 
the Christian tradition. In telling the ‘true history of Christianity’, Nietzsche argues that 
‘there was really only one Christian’ (AC 39) whose ‘bequest to humanity was a practice: 
his behaviour towards the judges, towards the henchmen, the way he acted in the face of 
his accusers and every type of slander and derision’ (AC 35). Jesus’ way of life was a 
non-essentialist practice of forgiveness that neither denigrated nor excluded. Against his 
enemies he offered no resistance, not out of weakness but out of strength. He neither 
defended his rights nor attempted to avert the most perilous of circumstances.
10
 And in 
                                                
9
 Geuss’ point is slightly different. But this reading has been informed by his work. We do, however, differ 
in various ways and degrees with regards to approach, interpretation and conclusion. 
10
 This was perhaps epitomized by the series of events that started with and followed the last supper. See 
Matthew 26:17-30; Luke 22:7-23 onwards. 
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place of resisting evil, he embraced and loved it for all its imperfections (AC 33, 35; WP 
158-163). 
For Nietzsche ‘the life of the redeemer was nothing other than this practice, – 
even his death was nothing else.’ Jesus had no need to participate in ritualistic traditions, 
performances or prayer to communicate with God for he understood ‘how the practice of 
life is the only thing that can make you feel “divine”, “blessed”, “evangelic”’ (AC 33). 
According to Nietzsche’s interpretation, Jesus’ life offered no redemption
11
 for humanity 
but instead taught people how they ought to live (AC 34). There is only one route to God 
and it lies neither in ‘atonement’ nor in ‘prayer’ but in the ‘evangelical practice’. In fact 
Nietzsche insists that this practice is ‘God’ itself (AC 33). 
But Jesus’ life was itself subject to interpretation. This interpretation transformed 
his life into a set of beliefs which gradually hardened into ritualistic performances and 
dogmatic principles. In the hands of Paul, the ‘life, example, teachings, death, meaning, 
and rights of the whole evangel’ was emptied out ‘after this hatred-inspired counterfeiter 
realized what he and he alone could use’ (AC 42). Jesus’ life was reduced to an 
instrument for dominance and with it arose the birth of the Church.  
Jesus had repudiated, through his way of life, the Jewish ‘concepts of “sin”, 
“forgiveness of sin”, “faith”, “redemption through faith”’ and the entire doctrine of its 
church (AC 33). But Paul’s interpretation reinstated some of these beliefs, suitably re-
defined, and created others while raising them to the level of dogma. The concept of an 
afterlife, the idea of eternal salvation, God, man’s original sin, the miracle of redemption 
through the ultimate sacrifice of God’s own son and his resurrection are but some of the 
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 There was/is no need for redemption.!
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interpretive conclusions drawn from what Nietzsche considers to be a fundamentally 
erroneous exegetical account of Jesus’ life (AC 33-41). This account stands at odds with 
what Jesus’ life had intended to signify, a ‘translation’ so poor that it represented not only 
a misinterpretation but the very antithesis of its meaning. ‘The fact that humanity knelt 
down before the opposite of the origin, the meaning, the right of the evangel, the fact that 
in the concept of “church”, humanity canonized the very thing the “bearer of glad 
tidings” [Jesus] felt to be beneath, him, behind him – you will not find a greater example 
of world-historical irony’ (AC 36). 
Paul’s depiction of Jesus’ life suggested that it was a lesson about guilt, 
punishment, sin and the distance between humanity and God. But Nietzsche asserts that 
Jesus had in fact ‘done away with the very idea of ‘guilt’ and ‘denied there was any gap 
between God and man’ (AC 41, 33). Jesus’ life did not convey that man was to live 
steeped in guilt and sin but that there was, in truth, no sin (A 33). Guilt, as Nietzsche 
explains in On the Genealogy of Morality, arises when the instincts are denied free 
expression and are discharged inwardly instead (GM II, 16-17). Sin ‘in man is not a fact, 
but rather the interpretation of a fact, namely a physiological upset, – the latter seen from 
a perspective of morals and religion’ (GM III, 16). Furthermore, (Christian) guilt turns on 
the idea of ‘free will’ which Nietzsche explicitly dismisses (HAH 39, 105; TI IV, 7; D 
112; BGE 21; GM I, 13; A 15; see also Geuss 2001, 330). And because Nietzsche 
understands Jesus’ way of life to be definitive of the Christian doctrine, God could not 
possibly stand above and beyond man. God was to be experienced through living in 
accordance with the practices established by Jesus. The kingdom of heaven, according to 
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Nietzsche, ‘is a state of the heart – not something lying ‘above the earth’ or coming ‘after 
death’ (AC 34; WP 160-161).  
The distance between God and man instituted by Paul resulted in another more 
troubling effect on Christianity. As a practice and a way of life, Christianity is an 
attainable goal. Living life as Jesus did is, for Nietzsche, ‘still possible today, for certain 
people it is even necessary: true original Christianity will always be possible … Not 
believing but a doing’ (AC 39). But Paul had transformed Christianity into something 
unachievable by reconstructing it as a faith. The kingdom of heaven could only be 
reached after death (and even then this was not guaranteed). Unlike Buddhism, a religion 
where perfection is not merely aspired to but constantly achieved, Christianity is 
grounded on the inescapability of imperfection and moral failure (AC 21). For Nietzsche, 
‘Buddhism does not promise, it delivers, Christianity promises everything and delivers 
nothing’ (AC 42).12  
Nietzsche’s genealogical study of Christianity reveals one more important point. In 
its quest to extend its reach, Christianity compromised the very grounds on which it 
rested. To appeal to the disparate masses it accommodated and assimilated cruder forms 
of ritualistic performances and maxims that were not necessarily consonant with its own 
practices. As Nietzsche writes:    
Every time Christianity expanded to greater and cruder masses of people whose 
presuppositions were increasingly remote from the presupposition under which it 
arose, it became increasingly necessary to vulgarize Christianity and make it 
barbaric, – Christianity soaked up doctrines and rites from all the subterranean 
cults of the imperium Romanum and bits of nonsense from all kinds of sick reason. 
Christianity’s faith was fated to become as sick, base, and vulgar as the sick, base, 
                                                
12
 Nietzsche also notes that the driving force of Christianity ‘is ressentiment, popular uprising, the revolt of 
the under-privileged. (It is otherwise with Buddhism: this is not born out of a ressentiment movement but 
fights ressentiment because it leads to action.)’ (WP 179) 
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and vulgar needs it catered to. Sick barbarism itself finally achieved power in the 
church. (AC 37)  
 
It should be made clear that Nietzsche’s genealogical review of Christianity is neither 
restricted to nor ends with Paul’s interpretation of it. Nietzsche does not reserve criticism 
exclusively for Paul but extends it to the whole priestly caste through which the church 
claims and administers authority. An important insight furnished by his genealogical 
reflections is that it demonstrates the extent to which interpretations can alter the meaning 
of preceding practices. Although Christianity as it is understood today is largely derived 
from Paul’s interpretation, this has itself in turn been subject to numerous interpretations. 
Subsequent interpretations do not wholly remove preceding interpretations but transform 
their meaning in accordance with their particular standpoints.
13
  
In his reading of Nietzsche’s genealogy of Christianity Geuss arrives at a similar 
conclusion, pointing out that ‘each historically successive interpretation/ coup de main 
gives the existing Christian way of life a new “meaning”’ (Geuss 2001, 331). 
Nevertheless he observes that Nietzsche ‘at one point says that Paul “annuls original 
Christianity”’ (WP 167)
14
 although this must not be taken to mean that ‘Paul wishes to 
abolish wholesale the practices that constitute this primordial form of Christianity’ 
(Geuss 2001, 331). This is a strange conclusion to arrive at; given especially Geuss’ 
acknowledgement in an earlier section of his paper that ‘Paul’s ‘interpretation’ represents 
so drastic and crude a misinterpretation of Jesus’ way of life’ that it essentially 
                                                
13
 I believe this is true with the exception of Paul’s interpretation. I address this below. 
14
 In Kaufmann and Hollingdale’s edition it is written ‘he annulled primitive Christianity as a matter or 
[sic] principle … Paul re-erected on a grand scale precisely that which Christ had annulled through his way 
of living’ (WP 167). Nietzsche also writes ‘The church is precisely that against which Jesus preached – and 
against which he taught his disciples to fight’ (WP 168).!
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transformed Christianity ‘into what is the exact reverse of anything Jesus himself would 
have practiced’ (Geuss 2001, 330). 
Paul might not have wished ‘to abolish wholesale the practices that constitute this 
primordial form of Christianity’ but he did.15 Nietzsche constantly reminds us that Paul’s 
subversive interpretation did in fact transform Christianity in its entirety. He writes, for 
example, that ‘it is false to the point of absurdity to think that Christians are characterized 
by their ‘beliefs’, like a belief in salvation through Christ: only the practice of 
Christianity is really Christian … To reduce Christianity to a set of claims taken to be 
true, to a simple phenomenalism of consciousness, is to negate Christianity’ (AC 39 
Emphasis added). Elsewhere, he labels Paul’s interpretation an ‘invention’ (AC 42).
16
 
For Nietzsche, then, interpretations can sometimes be so radical and subversive 
that the original meaning of certain practices is completely overcome or transformed into 
a meaning that is both antithetical and alien to its foundations. A reinterpretation that 
violates its premises constitutes not an assimilation and re-working of practices that 
maintains some form of its original presuppositions but an abolition of these practices. 
The point of genealogy is to trace these transformations and recognize that definitions as 
well as meanings can alter significantly throughout history. To assume that subsequent 
events or meanings always encompass a qualified integration of preceding meanings is to 
assume a version of continuity that genealogy denies. In short, Paul’s interpretation of 
Jesus’ life resulted in the complete abolition of its meaning and intention to the extent 
                                                
15
 Even this point might be contested. Nietzsche seems to think that this misinterpretation was intentional.!
16
 Nietzsche also writes that ‘one should not confuse Christianity as a historical reality with that one root 
that its name calls to mind: the other roots from which it has grown up have been far more powerful. It is an 
unexampled misuse of words when such manifestations of decay and abortions as “Christian church,” 
“Christian faith” and Christian life” label themselves with that holy name. What did Christ deny? 
Everything that is today Christian. (WP 158, Emphasis added) 
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that his interpretation became an invention. In Nietzsche’s words, ‘deus, qualem Paulus 
creavit, dei negatio – God, as created by Paul, is a negation of God’ (AC 47).17 
 
Nietzsche’s Critique of [Christian] Morality 
 
In the preface to Daybreak Nietzsche claims that ‘in this book morality is 
withdrawn – but why? Out of morality!’ (D P, 4) Elsewhere, he remarks that ‘morality in 
Europe these days is the morality of herd animals: – and therefore, as we understand 
things, it is only one type of human morality beside which, before which, and after which 
many other (and especially higher) moralities are or should be possible’ (BGE 202). 
These statements should illustrate that Nietzsche does not repudiate all forms of morality 
but only slave (traditional) morality and other associated moral doctrines.
18
 The 
fundamental question is, of course, why he thinks it critical and necessary to assail 
morality and its underlying principles. In what follows, I examine the grounds of his 
arguments. 
There are several reasons for Nietzsche’s renunciation of and objection to 
traditional morality. The first and most overlooked reason is that it is inherently 
                                                
17
 Anyone who attempts to challenge Nietzsche with the use of the Gospels must first come to terms with 
his critique of them. Nietzsche writes that ‘the Gospels are invaluable testimony to the already inescapable 
corruption within the first congregation … You cannot read these Gospels carefully enough; every word is 
problematic’ (AC 44; see also AC 45-46). 
18
 I do not believe that these two statements alone can resolve the debate of Nietzsche’s immoralism and 
what it entails. Some argue that Nietzsche does not reject all morality but only prevailing morality. Others 
suggest that he denies all morality. See Foot (1994), Nehamas (1985), Schacht (1995), Kaufmann (1974) 
and Clark (1994). I see Kantian morality, natural law and common morality, insofar as they can be 
distinguished, as examples of associated forms of morality. For example, Nietzsche writes ‘Kant’s Joke. – 
Kant wanted to prove, in a way that would dumbfound the whole world, that the whole world was right: 
that was the secret joke of this soul. He wrote against the scholars in favour of popular prejudice, but for 
scholars and not for the people’ (GS 193). Types of morality that he may appreciate are aristocratic 
morality and Buddhist teachings.  
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hypocritical. Distinguishing the teachings and practices of morality reveals a persistent 
violation of its grounds and presuppositions that continuously passes unnoticed because 
of its lack of reflectiveness. Nietzsche argues, for example, that the praise of selflessness 
is predicated not on a regard for altruism as a virtuous quality in itself but on the benefits 
received from these acts of selflessness. He writes that: 
A person’s virtues are called good with respect to their presumed effects not on him 
but on us and society – the praise of virtues has always been far from ‘selfless’, far 
from ‘unegoistic’! For otherwise one would have had to recognize that the virtues 
(such as diligence, obedience, chastity, piety, justice) are mostly harmful to their 
possessors, being drives which dominate them all too violently and covetously and 
in no way let reason keep them in balance with other drives. (GS 21) 
 
Nietzsche adds that ‘the neighbour praises selflessness because it brings him advantages! 
If the neighbour himself thought “selflessly”, he would reject this decrease in strength, 
this harm for his benefit’. A truly selfless individual ‘would work against the 
development’ of selflessness in society as he would gain no advantage from such a 
condition. And ‘above all he would affirm his selflessness by not calling it good’ (GS 
21). 
That authentic selflessness demands the advocacy of selfishness is unsettling to 
traditional moral understanding. It reveals that the ‘motives’ of morality ‘stand in 
opposition to its principle’ and that ‘what this morality wants to use as its proof, it refutes 
with its criterion of what is moral’.
19
 Nietzsche does provide an escape, but it requires a 
self-renunciation and self-sacrifice that ‘could be proclaimed only by a being which 
thereby renounced its own advantage and perhaps, through the demanded sacrifice of the 
individual, brought about its own destruction’ (GS 21).  
                                                
19
 ‘Thus one preaches, in the same breath, a ‘Thou shalt’ and a ‘Thou shalt not’!’ (GS 21)!
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This statement is important to our appreciation of Nietzsche’s moral critique. In the 
preceding study of Nietzsche’s genealogy of Christian morality, it was revealed that 
Jesus’ way of life consisted of forgiveness and abstinence from resistance, self-defense 
and aversion to danger. He did not retaliate against evil received but loved it despite its 
harmful consequences. He lived according to his principles and taught humanity the 
lessons of life through the example of his own. In holding on to his principle of non-
retaliation as well as refusing to defend his rights, Jesus was drawn into a series of events 
that eventually led to his final demise. But it was precisely because Jesus refused to 
contravene his commitment to his own principles that he ‘renounced his own advantage’ 
and eventually brought ‘about his own destruction’. Jesus lived his doctrine20 – the truly 
selfless life – even in death and it is for this reason that Nietzsche regarded him as one of 
his greatest adversaries. The Antichrist – a work in which Nietzsche refers to Jesus as the 
‘bearer of glad tidings’ (AC 35), a term he later uses self-referentially (EH XIV, 1)
21
 – 
should be read not only as a critique of Christianity but as an impassioned defense of a 
great adversary whom he deeply respected (see also HAH I, 531).
22
  
To return to my central point, it is clear that Nietzsche regards traditional morality 
as fundamentally inconsistent. In misunderstanding its grounds and presuppositions, it 
violates its principles when it is laid out in practice. Our praise for selflessness arises 
from self-interestedness. From this standpoint we have simply failed to acknowledge that 
our generosity steals.  
                                                
20
 He lived his will to power. 
21
 Nietzsche writes ‘I am a bearer of glad tidings as no one ever was before’. In this way he regarded 
himself as prevailing over Christ. 
22
 We must remember that for Nietzsche, the greatest of enemies are worth defending.!!
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The second reason for Nietzsche’s repudiation of morality is that it abolishes the 
conditions necessary for the realization of human excellence (Leiter 1995; Foot 2001). 
Put differently, it restricts human flourishing by imposing unsuitable and injurious 
normative restraints on individuals whose natural aptitudes and talents far exceed that of 
the common person. For Nietzsche traditional morality serves the interests of the masses 
to the detriment of the elite. It does so by designating what Nietzsche considers to be 
noble characteristics, instincts, qualities and social conditions as ‘evil’ and in need of 
circumscription. He asserts, for example, that Christian morality ‘has taken the side of 
everything weak, base, failed, it has made an ideal out of whatever contradicts the 
preservation instincts of a strong life; it has corrupted the reason of even the most 
spiritual natures by teaching people to see the highest spiritual values as sinful, as 
deceptive, as temptations’ (AC 5).  
Elsewhere, he writes that ‘every unegoistic morality that considers itself 
unconditional and is directed toward everyone does not just sin against taste: it is a 
provocation to sins of omission, and one more temptation under a mask of benevolence – 
a temptation and injury to precisely the higher, the rarer, the privileged’ (BGE 221). In 
that same work, Nietzsche points out forcefully that ‘what is right for someone absolutely 
cannot be right for someone else; that the requirement that there be a single morality for 
everyone is harmful precisely to the higher men; in short, that there is an order of rank 
between people, and between moralities as well’ (BGE 228). And lest there be any doubt: 
When a decadent type of person is raised to the highest rank, this can only happen 
at the expense of the opposing type, the type of person who is strong and sure of 
life. When the herd animal shines forth with the brilliance of the purest of virtue, 
the exceptional type of person will necessarily be devalued down into evil. (EH IV, 
5) 
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Nietzsche raises similar objections to morality in many other passages.
23
 It must be said 
that Nietzsche does not reject morality on the grounds of its claim to universality (Leiter 
2001, 233; Geuss 1997, 8; cf. Nehamas 1985, 209-224).
24
 Rather, it is the harm it poses 
to higher individuals that makes traditional morality problematic. To be sure, Nietzsche 
does think that traditional morality’s claim to universality is wrong. But illusory claims 
do not, on their own, warrant repudiation as they may occasionally be life-enhancing and 
necessary. For Nietzsche, context is important in deciding whether or not certain forms of 
morality are to be accepted or denied. As Geuss puts it, ‘the question in ethics is not: ‘Is 
this the right way to act, live, feel, etc. for everyone, everywhere at all times?’ but: ‘What 
are the particular strengths and weaknesses of this form of morality for this person or this 
group of people at this time?’ (Geuss 1997, 8).  
 These comments raise two obvious questions – who are these higher types and why 
does traditional morality harm them?  
 
 
                                                
23
 Nietzsche raises a question that captures the mood of his inquiry. He asks ‘What if the opposite were 
true? What if a regressive trait lurked in ‘the good man’, likewise a danger, an enticement, a poison, a 
narcotic, so that the present lived at the expense of the future? Perhaps in more comfort and less danger, but 
also in a smaller-minded, meaner manner? … So that morality itself were to blame if man, as species, never 
reached his highest potential power and splendour? So that morality itself was the danger of danger? …’ 
(GM P, 6) In another comment he writes that ‘the whole of European morality is based upon what is useful 
to the herd: the affliction of all higher, rarer men lies in this, that everything that distinguishes them enters 
their consciousness accompanied by a feeling of diminution and discredit … The more dangerous a quality 
seems to the herd, the more thoroughly it is proscribed’ (WP 276).  For other similar comments see GM III, 
14; BGE 62, 212 WP 274, 400, 879, 957; D 163.  
24
 Both Leiter and Geuss are unclear about this. Geuss writes, for example, that ‘Nietzsche does not, then, 
object to Christian morality because it is based on particular false beliefs or because it erroneously claims 
absolute status for itself’ (Geuss 1997, 8). They both fail to make explicit what they mean when they 
distinguish between an objection to universality per se and Nietzsche’s objection. One could argue that it is 
precisely the claim to universality that makes morality problematic for in making such a claim it imposes 
itself on higher types. Morality may be detrimental to higher types but if it does not claim universality then 
it is no longer a problem. In this way, universality is the problem. I believe, however, that my subsequent 
statements explain, at least in part, what is meant by their statements.  
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The Higher Types 
 
Broadly speaking nature divides humanity into different classes of individuals 
each possessing distinct physiological characteristics and attributes. It ‘separates out 
predominantly spiritual people from people characterized by muscular and 
temperamental strength from a third group of people who are not distinguished in either 
way, the mediocre’ (AC 57). Through these physiological distinctions, individuals are 
distinguished hierarchically with the mediocre forming the largest class. This numerical 
superiority underscores the rarity and exceptionality of the most spiritual which 
Nietzsche labels ‘the perfect caste’, ‘the few’ or ‘the noble’. 
Nietzsche describes the higher type as one who possesses great strength and 
enhanced spirituality (A 57; GM III, 1). He is loyal, magnanimous, courageous, 
independent, healthy, resilient and cares for his reputation (D 199; EH I, 2; WP 776). The 
‘consciousness of power’ figures constantly throughout his physiology and he ‘responds 
to a provocation with restraint and a clear head, not as though horrified, crushed, 
mortified, breathless, in the manner of the plebeian’. He maintains a ‘constant 
cheerfulness and civility even in painful situations’, upholding ‘the impression that his 
soul and spirit are equal to every danger and surprise’ (D 201).  
Nietzsche often speaks of his admiration for certain individuals who exemplify 
the higher type in various ways and in various degrees. Napoleon, Shakespeare, 
Beethoven, Goethe and Thucydides are amongst the few persons (other than himself) 
whom he holds in high regard. One individual stands out prominently from this list – 
Goethe. For Nietzsche, Goethe represents not just a ‘German event but a European one: a 
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magnificent attempt to overcome the eighteenth century by returning to nature,
25
 by 
coming towards the naturalness of the Renaissance, a type of self-overcoming on the part 
of that century’ (TI IX, 49; see also 50-51). In an earlier work, he even describes Goethe 
as ‘not only a good and great human being but a culture’ (WS 125). Affirming life in and 
through all his endeavours, he never despaired and sought as much responsibility as he 
possibly could. Goethe successfully engaged in self-creation. 
What is interesting for our present purposes is Nietzsche’s remark about the type 
of individual Goethe admired. 
A strong, highly educated, self-respecting human being, skilled in all things 
physical and able to keep himself in check, who could dare to allow himself the 
entire expanse and wealth of naturalness, who is strong enough for this freedom; 
a person who is tolerant out of strength and not weakness because he knows how 
to take advantage of thing that would destroy an average nature; a person lacking 
all prohibitions expect for weakness, whether it is called a vice or virtue … A 
spirit like this who has become free stands in the middle of the world with a 
cheerful and trusting fatalism in the belief that only the individual is 
reprehensible, that everything is redeemed and affirmed in the whole – he does 
not negate anymore … (TI IX, 49) 
 
Two characteristics are worth mentioning in detail. The first is the higher 
individual’s ability to ‘not to react immediately to a stimulus, but instead to take control 
of the inhibiting, excluding instincts’. According to Nietzsche, every ‘characteristic 
absence of spirituality, every piece of common vulgarity, is due to an inability to resist a 
stimulus – you have to react, you follow every impulse’ (TI VIII, 6). Rather than blindly 
submit to one’s prejudices and passions, one must learn to ‘encompass and take stock of 
an individual case’ from all standpoints, ‘postponing judgment’ and suspending decision 
                                                
25
 This idea of returning to nature must be understood properly. Nietzsche writes ‘I talk about a ‘return to 
nature’ too, although it is not really a going back as much as a coming-towards – towards a high, free, even 
terrible nature and naturalness, the sort of nature that plays, that can play, with great tasks …’ (TI IX, 48). 
Nature is not something we return to but something we arrive at by self-overcoming. 
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throughout this process. The ability to resist reacting to stimulus and impulse is, however, 
tightly implicated in one’s physiological condition. Yielding to impulse is frequently 
‘already a pathology, a decline’ or a ‘symptom of exhaustion’ (TI VIII, 6). 
Nietzsche also describes how the attribution of a ‘cause’ can sometimes fall into 
error. Occurrences of things that appear unfamiliar to us often breed fear and anxiety and 
are accordingly regarded as dangerous. ‘Familiarizing something unfamiliar is 
comforting, reassuring, satisfying and produces a feeling of power as well’ (TI VI, 5). 
Our immediate concern when faced with the unfamiliar is to transform it into that which 
is recognizable, alleviating our instinctive agitations. Since this is our primary concern, 
the ‘question “why” won’t point to the cause as such, but instead will point to a 
particular type of cause – a reassuring comforting cause’. Because the attempt to 
establish causality is largely conditioned by anxiety, we search (quickly) for causes that 
are already familiar to us, thus foreclosing the ‘possibility that anything novel, alien, or 
previously unencountered can be a cause’ (TI IV, 5). The search for causality is the 
search for an already predetermined ‘type of explanation’ – an explanation that will 
remove us from the condition of disquietude. An explanation of this nature grows to 
become ‘prevalent, gets concentrated into a system, and finally emerges as dominant, 
which is to say it completely rules out other causes and explanations’ (TI IV, 5).  
Where the common man seeks familiarity in the unfamiliar, the higher individual 
pauses to examine the unfamiliar from all possible angles. As Nietzsche understands it, 
the higher individual will not submit to his desire for immediate causal resolution but 
instead will postpone judgment and suspend decision until necessary. His strength allows 
him to seek alien causes, which expands his intellectual horizons beyond the familiar. In 
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this way, knowledge is not trapped within the grid of common presuppositions, 
propositions, and assertions but is allowed to develop in truly novel ways. And it is this 
strength to navigate the unfamiliar that is wholly absent in the individual of mediocrity.  
The second characteristic worth mentioning is that the higher type is a creative 
being who assumes the form of a philosopher and artist. In one of his earlier works, 
written in the summer of 1874 and published on his thirtieth birthday, Nietzsche remarks 
‘that nature has wanted to make existence explicable and significant to man through the 
production of the philosopher and the artist is, given nature’s own desire for redemption, 
certain’ (SE 7). These individuals are, of course, a rare occurrence, for ‘nature propels the 
philosopher [and the artist] into mankind like an arrow; it takes no aim but hopes the 
arrow will stick somewhere. But countless times it misses and is depressed at the fact’ 
(SE 7). In this statement, Nietzsche intimates that higher individuals are serendipitous 
occurrences in human history. But this is made clear in The Antichrist when he writes:  
In another sense, there is a continuous series of individual successes in the most 
varied places on earth and from the most varied cultures; here a higher type does 
in fact present itself, a type of overman in relation to humanity in general. 
Successes like this, real strokes of luck, were always possible and perhaps will 
always be possible. And whole generations, families, or peoples can sometimes 
constitute this sort of bull’s eye, right on the mark. (AC see also BGE 274)  
 
Nietzsche insists that it is important to distinguish between ‘philosophical labourers and 
scientific men in general’ and true ‘philosophers’ (BGE 211). The tasks for the former lie 
first in consolidating those values that were once ‘posited’ and ‘created’; values that, 
through their dominance, attained the status of “truths” that were eventually ‘pressed’ 
into ‘formulas’. After reinforcing these values, philosophical labourers or ‘researchers’ 
proceed to ‘make everything that has happened or been valued so far look clear, obvious, 
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comprehensible, and manageable, to abbreviate everything long, even “time” itself, and 
to overwhelm the entire past’ (BGE 211).26 
In contrast, the task of the higher type is to ‘create values’ (BGE 211, 260). For 
Nietzsche ‘true philosophers are commanders and legislators: they say “That is how it 
should be!” they are the ones who first determine the “where to?” and “what for?” of 
people’ (BGE 211). They want to ‘create new things and a new virtue’ as opposed to the 
‘good person’ who ‘wants old things, and for old things to be preserved’ (Z I, 10). The 
research provided by philosophical labourers is used to understand the values of the past, 
facilitating the creative processes that lead into the future. As Nietzsche describes it, the 
higher types learn ‘only for creating’ (Z III, 12, 16). 
Nietzsche’s philosophers of the future are individuals ‘with the most 
comprehensive responsibility, whose conscience bears the weight of the overall 
development of humanity’ (BGE 61, Emphasis added). Their task lies in the creation of 
new values that will replace the hollow and increasingly unsustainable values of the 
present. That which is new is, however, ‘under all circumstances’ mistaken as evil, ‘being 
that which wants to conquer, to overthrow the old boundary stones and pieties’ (GS 4). In 
short, a creative ethos that results in the destruction of common values necessarily 
invokes hostility from the herd. As Nietzsche writes in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: 
The creator they hate the most; he who breaks tablets and old values, the breaker 
– him they call the lawbreaker. 
Because the good, you see – they can not create: they are always the beginning 
of the end –  
– they crucify the one who writes new values on new tablets, they sacrifice the 
future to themselves – they crucify all future humanity! (Z III, 12, 26). 
                                                
26
 See note 17 on Kant’s trick. It is also worth noting that Nietzsche does not think that a superior intellect 
is sufficient for thinking against customary ideas. ‘To think otherwise than is customary is much less the 
effect of a superior intellect than of strong, evil inclinations – detaching, isolating, defiant, gloating, and 
malicious inclinations’ (GS 35). 
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Because the philosopher of the future is ‘necessarily a person of tomorrow and the day 
after tomorrow’, he has, in all ages, ‘needed to be at odds with his today: his enemy has 
always been the ideal of today’ (BGE 212). But time will vindicate these lawbreakers of 
the present, for the values they create will eventually be recognized as indispensible to 
the flourishing of the human race.  
 
How Morality Thwarts Excellence 
 
Traditional morality impedes the development of human excellence by 
eradicating the very conditions necessary for such a development to occur (Leiter 1995; 
Foot, 2001). These conditions may take the form of characteristics, social conditions, 
behavioral patterns or instincts. Regardless of the nature of these conditions, Nietzsche 
emphasizes that traditional morality privileges the needs of the weak at the expense of 
those with the potential for greatness by commending conditions hostile to the 
enhancement of humanity. 
Traditional morality considers certain values – altruism, selflessness, happiness, 
equality and pity – to be values worth promoting. In contrast, selfishness (or self-
interest), suffering, inequality, and indifference to the suffering of others are values to be 
abhorred (Leiter 1995). But Nietzsche considers these norms to be a hindrance to the 
development of the higher types. In what follows, I will explain his position, focusing 
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The passions – sensuality, pride, greed, thirst to dominate and exact revenge, to 
name a few – are, for Nietzsche, the ‘root[s] of life’. He acknowledges that ‘all passions 
go through a phase where they are just a disaster, where they drag their victim down with 
the weight of their stupidity’ (TI V, 1). Because of their detrimental effects, individuals 
initially sought to destroy the passions. But Nietzsche argues against submitting to such 
an impulse and contends that the passions eventually emerge from this phase and enter 
another, where ‘they marry themselves to the spirit, where they ‘spiritualize’ themselves’ 
(TI V, 1).  
The spiritualization of the passions is fundamental to the development and 
flourishing of humanity. Love – the spiritualization of sensuality – provides us with one 
excellent example. The spiritualization of hostility, which ‘involves a deep appreciation 
of the value of having enemies’ furnishes us with another (TI V, 3). For Nietzsche, even 
the most magnanimous person is one ‘with a most extreme thirst for vengeance’. But he 
is one ‘who sees satisfaction nearby and drinks it down already in imagination so fully, 
thoroughly and to the last drop that a tremendous, quick nausea follows this quick excess 
and he now rises “above himself”, as they say, and forgives his enemy, indeed blesses 
and honours him’ (GS 49). In these instances, humanity is raised beyond its present state 
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 I focus on pity and suffering because they are relevant to our discussion here, which follows from the 
preceding argument. I do not consider equality/ inequality to be a passion, although Nietzsche would argue 
that our instincts or drives do play a role in how much we value it. I will discuss equality and inequality in 
the next chapter on politics for I take liberal democratic politics to be, in part, about equality and the 
elimination of human suffering. Of course, I recognize that Christian morality also strives to remove 
suffering and teaches that we are all equal.
 51 
not through destroying the passions but through spiritualizing them. Destroying the 
passions would render such an enhanced state impossible.  
Instead of asking how desires may be ‘spiritualized, beautified’ or ‘deified’, 
Christianity ‘combats the passions by cutting them off in every sense: its technique, its 
“cure”, is castration’ (TI V, 1). As Nietzsche understands it, castration and eradication 
are ‘instinctively chosen’ by individuals who are ‘too weak and degenerate to exercise 
any restraint in a struggle against a desire’ (TI V, 2). ‘Radical means [such as castration] 
are’, in his opinion, ‘only indispensable for degenerates; weakness of the will or, to be 
exact, the inability not to react to a stimulus, is itself just another form of degeneration’ 
(TI V, 2). Yet it has been demonstrated that the higher types are precisely those capable 
of restraint and sublimation. In castrating the passions, Christian morality robs the higher 
type and humanity of the possibility of human excellence by taking away the conditions 
necessary for its development.
28
 
It would be foolish, however, to understand Nietzsche’s attack on traditional 
morality purely in terms of its insensitivity to the possibilities of spiritualization or 
sublimation. He remarks elsewhere that the value of ‘evil’ passions or drives is often 
disregarded in moral thinking.
29
 In one instance, he argues that ‘evil drives are just as 
expedient, species-preserving, and indispensible as the good ones – they just have a 
different function’ (GS 4). Elsewhere, he writes that if we ‘examine the lives of the best 
and most fruitful people and peoples’, we will see that ‘misfortune and external resistance 
… hatred, jealousy, stubbornness, mistrust, hardness, greed, and violence’ all belong to 
                                                
28
 The sublimation thesis is most thoroughly defended by Walter Kaufmann.  
29
 Here I follow Daniel Ahern when he writes that Nietzsche uses the terms ‘instincts’, ‘drives’, ‘passions’, 
‘needs’ and ‘desires’ equivocally. See Daniel Ahern, Nietzsche as Cultural Physician (Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), p.17 
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the ‘favourable conditions without which any great growth even of virtue is scarcely 
possible’ (GS 19). In these passages, Nietzsche draws attention to the way in which ‘evil 
drives’ and unfortunate circumstances contribute to the overall development and 
preservation of the species, not through spiritualization or sublimation, but as drives and 
circumstances in their own right.
30
 Conversely, the drives that are conventionally 
regarded as ‘good’ may do a great deal of harm, as we shall now see Nietzsche argue in 
the case of pity. 
 
Nietzsche’s Critique of Pity 
 
Before proceeding to examine Nietzsche’s critique of pity, it is first necessary to 
establish its meaning. Aristotle identifies the distinctive features of pity as a ‘certain pain 
occasioned by an apparently destructive evil or pain’s occurring to one who does not 
deserve it, which the pitier might expect to suffer himself or that one of his own would, 
and this whenever it should seem near at hand’ (R VI, 2.8). This definition consists of 
three inter-related propositions (see Nussbaum 1994, 141-142). First, pity arises only 
when the suffering experienced by an individual is not the result of desert or culpability. 
Second, the pitier must believe himself or his loved ones to be susceptible to the 
conditions responsible for such suffering and have a reasonable expectation that such 
circumstances could indeed occur. And third, the suffering experienced must be 
considerable. Together, these propositions form the basis of what pity is and describe 
how it arises. 
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 See BGE 149.!
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This definition of pity is certainly questionable. One might object that it is entirely 
possible to feel pity for a person suffering from a severe physiological defect that is not 
only specific to him but also has no possibility of ever manifesting itself in any other 
individual. In this case, the expectation of similar pain is denied as a requisite for pity, for 
no one is susceptible to the severe defect that is the cause of this individual’s suffering. 
But in rejoinder, susceptibility need not take the form of suffering from similar 
afflictions. Instead, susceptibility may simply imply that the pitier believes that he or his 
loved ones may one day suffer from a severe physiological defect specific to them. The 
distinction here is between suffering from the same afflictions and suffering from 
afflictions of a similar nature. While the actuality of the affliction may differ, the 
possibility of suffering from a similar form of affliction may be sufficient to satisfy the 
condition of susceptibility. In this way, Aristotle’s definition remains adequate and useful 
for understanding pity. 
Nietzsche never disguises his distaste for pity. Pity is pathological, a sickness 
from which humanity must be rescued. To appreciate his attack on pity, it is necessary to 
distinguish between the harm it brings to the one who pities and the one who is pitied. In 
Daybreak, Nietzsche argues that pity increases ‘the amount of suffering in the world’ and 
points out that it is a sentiment felt only by the one who pities (D 134, 133). Pitying 
results in a severe loss of strength (AC 7) and threatens the pitier further by making him 
susceptible to being harmed by those seeking pity (HAH I, 50). It empowers the seekers 
by providing them with ‘the power to hurt’ in spite of all their weaknesses. This ability 
furnishes the weak with a ‘sort of pleasure’ by reaffirming their material relevance, 
proving that they are still ‘of sufficient importance to cause affliction in the world’ (HAH 
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I, 50).  The desire for pity is therefore grounded on a sense of pleasure that arises at ‘the 
expense of one’s fellow men’ (HAH I, 50). Individuals who pity are susceptible to 
suffering, hurt or manipulation if they allow themselves to feel for those who are 
suffering. 
Conversely, for individuals of noble integrity to be pitied is to suffer insult, shame 
and humiliation. Pity is offered only to ‘contemptible creatures’ whom one does not want 
to see suffer. But one who refuses to ‘cry out for pity’ and ‘relinquish his pride under 
torture’ receives admiration rather than pity. To kill an enemy who displays such courage 
is to grant him honour and respect. A pardon awarded in response to pleading comes at a 
great cost to an individual’s dignity. To receive pity in this instance is to suffer the ‘most 
shameful and profoundest humiliation’ (D135).
31
   
Furthermore, pity equips individuals with the means to dominate and control 
those who receive pity. ‘When we see someone suffering, we like to use this opportunity 
to take possession of him’ (GS 14). In offering assistance to the suffering, benefactors 
attain a certain degree of power and superiority over them. Dominance arises when the 
pitied feel indebted to their patrons. In this way, pity causes those who suffer to fall 
further into dependency, the result of which is the deepening of an already asymmetrical 
power relationship between them and their benefactors.  
Nietzsche’s last objection to pity turns on the related ideas of decay and self-
reliance. Pity is criticized because it ‘preserves things that are ripe for decline, it defends 
things that have been disowned and condemned by life, and it gives a depressive and 
questionable character to life itself by keeping alive an abundance of failures of every 
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 Nietzsche’s understanding of being pitied as suffering from insult descends from the Stoics.  
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type’ (AC 7). More importantly, it strips away an individual’s self-reliance through 
beneficence and the fostering of mutual aid. Pity impels us to help those who are 
suffering but doing so abolishes self-reliance and with it, the potential for human 
excellence. Self-reliance in the face of adversity is both an indication of one’s strength of 
character and an instrument to its development. Pity that translates into social action 
interferes with independent attempts to endure and overcome misfortune. For Nietzsche, 
the higher individual is only able to become who he is if he prevails over adversity 
independently rather than through the assistance of others. 
Nietzsche’s condemnation of pity is not unique in the history of western 
philosophy. Past attempts at theorizing pity have also considered it to be harmful to 
humanity. Spinoza, for example, understands pity (commiseratio) to be ‘pain arising from 
another’s hurt’ (Ethics III, Prop. 22). It arises partially because ‘he who imagines that 
what he loves is affected with pain will likewise be affected with pain, the intensity of 
which will vary with the intensity of this emotion in the object loved’ (Ethics III, Prop. 
21). Spinoza does not, however, simply ground pity in affection. He acknowledges that it 
is possible to pity ‘a thing for which we have previously felt no emotion’ as long as ‘we 
judge it similar to ourselves’ (Ethics III, Prop. 22). When we ‘imagine someone like 
ourselves to be affected by an emotion, this thought will express an affection of our own 
body similar to that emotion’. Following from this, imagining ‘a thing like ourselves to 
be affected by an emotion’ leaves us ‘affected by a similar emotion along with it’. 
Spinoza defines this ‘imitation of emotions, when it is related to pain’ as pity. (Ethics III, 
Prop. 27).  
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It is interesting to note that Spinoza understands pity as an imitation of pain 
suffered in a thing like ourselves. Conversely, Nietzsche argues that the pain suffered by 
the pitied and the pain suffered as a result of pity are distinct. In pitying, we do not 
imitate the pain experienced by another. Rather we experience an entirely different kind 
of suffering (cf. D 133). Nevertheless, Spinoza argues that pity is bad in itself for it is a 
suffering experienced. The good that arises from pity, that is, the attempt to alleviate the 
suffering of the pitied, should proceed from reason rather than pity. The corollary of this 
assessment is that pity is rendered ‘useless’ to the individual who lives under the 
instruction of reason (Ethics IV, Prop. 50). 
Kant is another philosopher who criticizes pity. He distinguishes sympathy, which 
locates humanity in the ‘capacity [Vermögen] and the will to share in others’ feelings 
(humanitas practica)’, from compassion32 [Mitleidenschaft], which locates humanity 
‘merely in the receptivity, given by nature itself, to the feeling of joy and sadness in 
common with others (humanitas aesthetica)’ (MM, 6:457). Unlike compassion, which is 
unfree and undermines individual autonomy, sympathy is free and grounded in practical 
reason. To allow ourselves to be ‘infected’ by another’s suffering through the 
‘imagination’ increases suffering despite the fact that the ‘trouble really (in nature) 
affects only one’. Kant argues that ‘there cannot possibly be a duty to increase the ills in 
the world and so to do good from compassion [mithin auch nicht aus Mitleid]’33. 
Moreover, he understands pity to be an ‘insulting kind of beneficence’ that ‘expresses the 
kind of benevolence one has toward someone unworthy’ (MM, 6:457). Kant shares with 
                                                
32
 Mitleidenschaft may also be translated as ‘imparted suffering’. 
33
 Gregor translates this as compassion, although the term Mitleid may more properly designate pity. It 
should also be noted that Gregor’s initial translation (1964) was ‘sympathetic sadness’. !!
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Nietzsche a belief that pity is insulting, although his repudiation of acting out of pity 
shares more in common with Spinoza’s assertion that one should act out of reason.  
David Cartwright correctly points out that Nietzsche is partially indebted to Kant 
for his ideas on pity (Cartwright, 1984). Nietzsche follows Kant in arguing that pity 
increases the amount of suffering in the world and that individuals under its influence 
lose a certain degree of autonomy. In fact, Cartwright demonstrates with an insightful 
comparison that Nietzsche actually quotes Kant without acknowledgement in a note on 
this subject. In this note, Nietzsche writes that ‘pity is a squandering of feeling, a parasite 
harmful to moral health, “it cannot possibly be our duty to increase the evil in the world” 
… pity does not depend upon maxims but upon affects; it is pathological. The suffering 
of others infects us, pity is an infection’ (WP 368). Nietzsche places the sentence ‘it 
cannot possibly be our duty to increase the evil in the world’ in quotation marks and it is 
clear that this phrase is taken from the section of Kant’s The Metaphysics of Morals 
mentioned above. In this note, Nietzsche also uses Kantian terms like ‘maxims’ and 
‘affects’ and, like Kant, describes pity as an ‘infection’. 
This does not mean that Nietzsche’s position on pity is identical to Kant’s. Their 
positions may share similarities but they also differ in many aspects. Contrasting their 
thoughts on pity requires a more extended argument than can be presented here. This 
said, the thrust of the present argument remains clear –Nietzsche’s criticism of pity is not 
unique but is in fact a lineal descendent of many other philosophical attempts at 
theorizing this subject. Situating his critique within this broader philosophical tradition 
establishes a context that enhances our understanding of his denial of the value of pity.  
 58 
Nietzsche’s position can be made more lucid by linking his arguments against pity 
with his thoughts on the significance of suffering. According to Nietzsche, ‘profound 
suffering makes you noble; it separates’ (BGE 270). ‘Harshness and cunning provide 
more favourable conditions for the origin of the strong, independent spirit and 
philosopher than that gentle, fine, yielding good nature and art of taking things lightly 
that people value’ (BGE 39). Struggle plays a critical role in the cultivation of strength 
and arises only when one is faced with the most difficult of circumstances (BGE 30, 44, 
262). This belief in the importance of harshness to personal growth is clearly expressed in 
The Gay Science: 
Examine the lives of the best and the most fruitful people and peoples and ask 
yourselves whether a tree which is supposed to grow to a proud height could do 
without bad weather and storms: whether misfortune and external resistance, 
whether any kinds of hatred, jealousy, stubbornness, mistrust, hardness, greed, 
and violence do not belong to the favourable conditions without which any great 
growth even of virtue is scarcely possible? The poison from which the weaker 
nature perishes strengthens the strong man – and he does not call it poison. (GS 
19).  
 
What traditional morality regards as unfavourable is often crucial for building character 
and spiritual enhancement. Coming to the aid of the suffering or attempting to abolish the 
difficult conditions under which one persists removes opportunities for struggle and 
development. Nietzsche’s poetic disquisition on this is worth quoting in full: 
The entire economy of my soul and the balance effected by ‘misfortune’, the 
breaking open of new springs and needs, the healing of old wounds, the 
shedding of entire periods of the past – all such things that can be involved in 
misfortune do not concern the dear compassionate one: they want to help and 
have no thought that there is a personal necessity of misfortune; that terrors, 
deprivations, impoverishments, midnights, adventures, risks, and blunders are as 
necessary for me and you as their opposites; indeed to express myself 
mystically, that the path to one’s own heaven always leads through the 
voluptuousness of one’s own hell. No, they know nothing of that: the ‘religion 
of compassion’ (or ‘the heart’) commands them to help … (GS 338) 
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But Nietzsche wants to say more than simply that a severe climate facilitates personal 
growth. He wants to emphasize that suffering is a necessary condition for the 
development of human excellence and that the advancement of humanity depends on 
great suffering. Pity, a sentiment that compels us to alleviate suffering, necessarily comes 
into conflict with the enhancement of humanity. As Nietzsche writes: 
Well-being as you understand it – that is no goal; it looks to us like an end!34 – a 
condition that immediately renders people ridiculous and despicable – that 
makes their decline into something desirable! The discipline of suffering, of 
great suffering – don’t you know that this discipline has been the sole cause of 
every enhancement in humanity so far? The tension that breeds strength into the 
unhappy soul, its shudder at the sight of great destruction, its inventiveness and 
courage in enduring, surviving, interpreting, and exploiting unhappiness, and 
whatever depth, secrecy, whatever masks, spirit, cunning, greatness it has been 
given: – weren’t these the gifts of suffering, of the disciple of great suffering? 
(BGE 225) 
 
Pity is, of course, not the only reason for the emergence of a state of ‘well-being’. Other 
factors like equality and the desire for happiness also contribute to the general condition 
Nietzsche contemptuously refers to as ‘snug coziness’ (GS 338; see also GS 106). But 
linking pity with suffering illustrates how the moral agenda of traditional morality 
abolishes the conditions necessary for human excellence. On Nietzsche’s account, 
humanity is enhanced through the higher types who in turn become ‘higher’ only by 
being able to survive, endure and overcome difficulty and misfortune. Pity, which seeks 
to abolish suffering, eventuates in the abjuration and dissolution of the foundations on 
which the future of humanity rests.  
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 Nietzsche also plays on the word ‘end’. We often regard well-being as an end to which we aspire, but in 












NIETZSCHE ON POLITICS 
 61 
 
A thousand goals there have been until now, for there have 
been a thousand peoples. Only the fetters for the thousand 
necks are still missing, the one goal is missing. Humanity still 
has no goal 
But tell me, my brothers: if humanity still lacks a goal, does it 
not also still lack – humanity itself? – 
– Friedrich Nietzsche 
Ours is essentially a tragic age, so we refuse to take it 
tragically. The cataclysm has happened, we are among the 
ruins, we start to build up new little habitats, to have new little 
hopes. It is rather hard work: there is now no smooth road into 
the future: but we go round, or scramble over the obstacles. 
We’ve got to live, no matter how many skies have fallen. 
– D. H. Lawrence 
 
Nietzsche’s criticism of traditional morality provides an important entry into his 
political ideas. His critique of politics is often phrased in terms familiar from his critique 
of morality, and he openly asserts that much of what passes for modern politics is indeed 
grounded on traditional moral premises. For example, when distinguishing between logic, 
art and politics in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche associates politics with morality: 
‘whether in the realm of logic or politics (morality) or art [sei es im Reiche des 
Logischen oder des Politischen (Moralischen) oder des Künstlerischen]’ (BGE 211).  He 
claims that democrats, ideologists of revolution and socialists are ‘one and all united in 
thorough and instinctive hostility towards all forms of society besides that of the 
autonomous herd and that the ‘democratic movement is the heir to Christianity’ (BGE 
202). More damningly, he writes in a later work: 
And let us not underestimate the disaster that Christianity has brought even into 
politics! Nobody is courageous enough for special privileges these days, for the 
rights of the masters, for feelings of self-respect and respect among equals – for 
a pathos of distance … Our politics is sick from this lack of courage! – The 
aristocraticism of mind has been undermined at its depths by the lie of the 
equality of souls; and when the belief in the privileges of the majority creates 
(and it will create) revolutions, do not doubt for a minute that it is Christianity, 
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that it is Christian value judgments these revolutions are translating into blood 
and crimes!’ (AC 43)  
 
This passage embodies much of Nietzsche’s political thinking and establishes its 
connection with the Christian moral tradition. It draws attention to his distaste for 
democracy and universal equality, his preference for aristocraticism and his belief that 
privileges and rights should be accorded to those naturally endowed with the qualities to 
rule. But it also discloses Nietzsche’s belief both in equality amongst equals as well as 
the possibility that politics could be healthy. This does not mean that Nietzsche aspires 
towards a particular type of political organization as an end in itself. But it does mean 
that he endorses a particular type of political arrangement rather than rejects politics in its 
entirety.  
It would appear logical to begin this study of Nietzsche’s political thought by 
examining his critique of democracy. But I believe it is prudent to first establish the thrust 
of Nietzsche’s philosophy and the place politics holds within it. Doing so will not only 
help elucidate his largely anti-democratic political thinking but also dispel notions that 
Nietzsche is simply a blind advocate of authoritarianism whose political ideas suffer from 
a severe lack of sophistication.  
Nietzsche announces on three occasions in The Gay Science that ‘God is dead’ 
(GS 108, 125, 343). Although the first pronouncement is expressed without 
consternation, the second describes this event with great urgency and severity. In this 
description, Nietzsche employs a parable of a madman who runs into the marketplace 
crying out that God has died. Significantly, the madman claims that we are responsible 
for his death; that ‘we are all his murderers’. He proceeds to question how humanity 
could have accomplished such a feat. ‘How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave 
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us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon?’ (GS 125). But this inquiry quickly passes 
over for the more urgent question of how we are to respond to this crisis, if it is indeed 
possible to respond.  
What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Where is it 
moving to now? Where are we moving to? Away from all suns? Are we not 
continually falling? And backwards, sidewards, forwards, in all directions? Is 
there still an up and a down? Aren’t we straying as though through an infinite 
nothing? Isn’t empty space breathing at us? Hasn’t it got colder? Isn’t night 
and more night coming again and again? Don’t lanterns have to be lit in the 
morning? (GS 125) 
 
These questions emphasize the seriousness of the consequences that arise with the death 
of God. Not only does it mean that the ‘belief in the Christian God has become 
unbelievable’ but it also signifies that the foundations of our present values have become 
unsustainable. Most of our normative and political beliefs are, in various ways and in 
various degrees, predicated on Christianity, which Nietzsche regards as a ‘system, a 
carefully considered, integrated view of things’. Breaking ‘off a main tenet’ of this 
system, like the faith in God, ‘smash[es] the whole system along with it’ (TI Skirmishes, 
5). In relinquishing the ‘Christian faith, you pull the rug out from under your right to 
Christian morality as well’. To believe that we can discard Christianity and still 
distinguish between good and evil is to remain hopelessly misguided and cretinous. As 
Nietzsche describes it, ‘when the English really believe that they ‘intuitively’ know all by 
themselves what is good and what is evil; and when as a result they think that they do not 
need Christianity to guarantee morality any more, this is itself just the result of the 
domination of the Christian value judgment and an expression of the strength and depth 
of this domination’ (TI Skirmishes, 5). 
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The broader significance of the death of God lies in its influence outside moral 
traditions. Nietzsche acknowledges that ‘our faith in science is still based on a 
metaphysical faith’ and that ‘even we knowers of today, we godless anti-metaphysicians 
still take our fire from the blaze set alight by a faith thousands of year old, that faith of 
the Christians, which was also Plato’s faith, that God is truth, that truth is divine’ (GM 
III, 24). But the divinity of truth turns on and leads to the death of God, and eventually 
calls this truth into question. ‘If God himself turned out to be our oldest lie’ we would 
need a new justification for our beliefs. Science cannot perform this function for ‘science 
itself now needs a justification (which is not at all to say that there is one for it)’ (GM III, 
24). For Nietzsche, ‘science itself never creates values’. Rather, it ‘first needs a value-
ideal, a value-creating power, serving which it is allowed to believe in itself’ (GM III, 
25).  
By killing God we have wiped ‘away the entire horizon’ (GS 125). But Nietzsche 
warns us in an earlier work that ‘a living thing can be healthy, strong and fruitful only 
when bounded by a horizon; if it is incapable of drawing a horizon around itself, and at 
the same time too self-centred to enclose its own view within that of another, it will pine 
away slowly or hasten to its timely end’ (HL 1, Emphasis added). Having had their 
justifications exposed as fraudulent, the values we rely on to orientate and make sense of 
our lives are duly revealed to be hollow and meaningless. Life itself becomes 
questionable and existence is felt to be nauseating. Although it is largely responsible for 
the death of God, science cannot succeed religion for it is incapable of creating the values 
needed to justify existence. Neither can we simply search for other ways to justify all of 
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our present values, for many of them are intrinsically related to the Christian tradition and 
cannot be justified in any other way.  
The collapse of this ‘Christian’ approach to and understanding of the world results 
in nihilism.  Nihilism means that ‘the highest values devalue themselves. The aim is 
lacking; “why?” finds no answer’ (WP 2). As Nietzsche explains it, the belief in 
meaninglessness ‘is the psychologically necessary effect once the belief in God and an 
essentially moral order becomes untenable. Nihilism appears at that point … one 
interpretation has collapsed; but because it was considered the interpretation it now seems 
as if there were no meaning at all in existence, as if everything were in vain’ (WP 55, 
Emphasis added; see also WP 1). The belief that ‘God is truth’ descends into the 
‘fanatical faith’ that ‘all is false’ (WP 1). The death of God signifies, then, the emptying 
out of meaning in the world – its transmogrification into an abyss. And when ‘you stare 
for a long time into an abyss, the abyss stares back into you’ (BGE 146). 
In a different vein, Nietzsche argues that Christianity itself leads to nihilism. It is 
not the collapse of our Christian understanding of the world but Christian understanding 
itself that fosters nihilistic tendencies in society. He describes Christianity as a ‘nihilistic 
philosophy that inscribed the negation of life on its shield’ and notes that ‘Nihilist and 
Christian: this rhymes, it does more than just rhyme’ (AC 7, 58). From this standpoint, 
Christianity is nihilistic because it privileges other-worldliness. It teaches that meaningful 
existence comes only after death and that a this-worldly life is inherently meaningless in 
God’s grand design (AC 43). In living for salvation, individuals consistently sacrifice the 
present for a fictional afterlife. This denial of the present is nihilism. 
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The two positions articulating the rise of nihilism are compatible. Christianity may 
eventuate in nihilistic tendencies, but the loss of Christian justification could also result in 
nihilism. Despite witnessing the abolition of the grounds of their values, some individuals 
are still likely to hold on to their metaphysical or theological faith, for ‘they would rather 
lie dying on an assured nothing than an uncertain something’ (BGE 10). For Nietzsche, 
we ‘confront a world of tremendous ruins. A few things are still towering; much looks 
decayed and uncanny, while most things are already lying on the ground’ (GS 358). His 
solution to the problem of nihilism lies in the higher individual.  
This man of the future will redeem us not just form the ideal held up till now, but 
also from the things which will have to arise form it, from the great nausea, the 
will to nothingness, from nihilism, that stroke of midday and of great decision 
which makes the will free again, which gives earth its purpose and man his hope 
again, this Antichrist and anti-nihilist, this conqueror of God and of nothingness – 
he must come one day ... (GM II, 24). 
 
Redemption from our metaphysical and theological delusions as well as nihilism lies in 
the higher type. Nietzsche’s assertion that ‘he must come one day’ betrays his concern 
that this individual may fail to arrive while redemption still remains a possibility. For 
Nietzsche, ‘mankind must work continually at the production of individual great men – 
that and nothing else is its task’ (SE, 6). The problem is ‘not what should replace 
humanity in the order of being (– the human being is an endpoint –): but instead what 
type of human should be bred, should be willed as having greater value, as being more 
deserving of life, as being more certain of a future’ (AC 3). 
Nietzsche notes that despite the death of God, ‘given the way people are, there 
may still for millennia be caves in which they show his shadow – And we – we must still 
defeat his shadow as well!’ (GS 108). If this is true, it appears that the exigency of 
finding a solution is overstated. But we would do well to remind ourselves 
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Nietzsche’s philosophy is a philosophy of and for the future. What might not seem urgent 
now will surely be of great concern eventually, assuming of course that his assessment is 
accurate. Moreover, Nietzsche believes that an individual’s physiology is the culmination 
of many generations of cultivation and is not simply parental inheritance. As he 
understands it, ‘the preparatory labor of many generations is needed for a philosopher to 
come about; each of his virtues needs to have been individually acquired, cared for, 
passed down, and incorporated’ (BGE 213). The process of ‘breeding’ the higher type 
must begin now if it is to be successful (see also Z I, Prologue 5; GS 9).35  
Politics is incapable of creating the values necessary to resolve humanity’s 
existential crisis. It cannot therefore be a solution to the problems plaguing contemporary 
society. ‘Every philosophy which believes that the problem of existence is touched on, 
not to say solved, by a political event is a joke – and pseudo-philosophy’ (SE 4). For 
Nietzsche, it is implausible that a ‘political innovation’ could ‘turn men once and for all 
into contented inhabitants of the earth’. The suggestion that the state is the ‘highest goal’ 
of humanity is merely a ‘relapse not into paganism but into stupidity’. His concern lies 
with ‘a species of man whose teleology extends somewhat beyond the welfare of the 
state, with philosophers, and with these only in relation to a world which is again fairly 
independent of the welfare of a state, that of culture’ (SE 4). 
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 Nietzsche writes, for example, that ‘countless thing that humanity acquired in earlier stages, but so feebly 
and embryonically that no one could tell that they have been acquired, suddenly emerge into the light much 
later, perhaps after centuries; meanwhile they have become strong and ripe. Some age seem to lack 
completely some talent or virtue, just as some people do: but just wait for their children and grandchildren, 
if you have time to wait – they bring to light the inner qualities of their grandfathers, the qualities that their 
grandfathers themselves did not know about. Often it is already the son that betrays his father: the father 
understands himself better once he has a son. All of us harbour in ourselves hidden gardens and plantations; 
and, to use another metaphor, we are all growing volcanoes approaching their hour of eruption; how near or 
distant that is, of course, nobody knows, not even the good Lord’ (GS 9). 
 68 
Humanity’s task resides, then, in fostering the ‘higher type’ whose ability to 
create values will redeem humanity from its modern ills and cultural decline. In 
subordinating everything to cultural development, Nietzsche reduces politics to a means 
rather than an end. It could be argued that he provides an excessively narrow 
interpretation of the nature of modern politics when he describes the state as a ‘goal’.
36
 
Nationalism does not exhaust the possibilities of political action. Politics could be 
understood as the activity of deliberating on the regulatory framework and mechanisms 
governing an association of individuals. It places the terms of association under question 
and allows for change through public discussion. But the terms of association are not an 
end, neither are they a means to an end. Rather, they constitute a legal framework that 
prescribes standards of conduct within which individuals may pursue their self-
determined ends.  
Two points are in order here. First, Nietzsche does not exclusively criticize 
nationalist politics. Liberal democracies and socialist tendencies are also ruthlessly 
censured and his dismissal of political innovation as a solution to humanity’s existential 
crisis is directed equally at both those political forms. It is worth mentioning that neither 
socialism nor liberal democracy unreservedly satisfies the above-mentioned definition of 
political activity. For example, a liberal-democratic state is often looked upon to provide 
social goods and (re)distributive justice. It must help alleviate widespread suffering and 
contribute to the well being of its citizens. At minimum, it must legislate with the welfare 
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 I have taken Nietzsche’s claims of the ‘state is the goal’ and ‘the welfare of the state’ as exemplifying 
nationalist tendencies. However, Nietzsche could have applied this understanding to democracies and 
socialism as well. If the well-being of the state is equated with the well-being of the entire community then 
it appears possible to include democracies in the category of the institutions concerned with the welfare of 
the state. Regardless, Nietzsche attacks all forms of non-aristocratic political arrangements. This will be 
discussed below. 
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of the broader community in mind. Policy initiatives are not merely rules articulating 
standards of conduct but instruments to achieving security and prosperity for all. 
Second and more importantly, it would be a mistake to suggest that Nietzsche’s 
criticism of liberal democracy and socialism is grounded on their failure to adhere to the 
standards of political activity mentioned earlier. Instead, his rejection of non-aristocratic 
forms of politics rests on the ideas of instrumentality and interference. Politics must 
either be instrumental to the development of culture and the higher individual or at least 
not interfere with this process. Non-aristocratic political arrangements fail to satisfy both 
conditions.  
 
Nietzsche on Democracy 
 
Nietzsche’s remarks on democracy appear mixed. On the one hand, he deplores it 
for the leveling and comforting effects it has on individuals and their social environment. 
On the other hand, it presents an opportunity for higher types to emerge and provides the 
foundation on which these higher types can build their cultural achievements. In this way, 
his position is reminiscent of Marx’s ambivalence to capitalism. Although Marx 
vehemently assailed capitalism for its deleterious effects on humanity, he accepted it as a 
necessary stage in the historical advancement to socialism. Unlike Marx, however, 
Nietzsche does not regard democracy as a necessary stage to cultural enhancement. It is a 
product of historical forces that, when pressed to its conclusion, could provide the 
material basis for cultural development. As we shall see, this does not imply approval of 
democracy as a political system in itself. 
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According to Nietzsche, the democratic movement is ‘not merely an abased form 
of political organization, but rather an abased (more specifically a diminished) form of 
humanity, a mediocritization and depreciation of humanity in value’ (BGE 203). Like 
socialists and anarchists, democrats are opposed to ‘any special claims, special rights, or 
privileges (which means, in the last analysis, that they are opposed to any rights: since 
when everyone is equal, no one will need “rights” anymore)’. They distrust ‘punitive 
justice’, are ‘united in their faith in the morality of communal pity’ and possess a ‘deadly 
hatred against suffering in general’ (BGE 202; see also WP 753). As such, they seek the 
abolition of suffering and ‘strive for with all their might’ the ‘universal, green pasture 
happiness of the herd, with security, safety, contentment, and an easier life for all’ (BGE 
44). The democratic movement is, in short, premised on the doctrines of ‘equal rights’ 
and ‘sympathy for all that suffers’ (BGE 44).  
Nietzsche associates the democratic movement with liberalism. As he understands 
it, ‘nothing destroys freedom more terribly or more thoroughly than liberal institutions … 
they undermine the will to power, they set to work leveling mountains and valleys and 
call this morality, they make things small, cowardly, and enjoyable’ (TI Skirmishes, 38). 
Liberal institutions ‘represent the continual triumph of herd animals’ and liberalism is 
simply ‘herd animalization, in other words’ (TI Skirmishes, 38).  
It is often demonstrated that Nietzsche criticizes liberal democracy for its leveling 
effects on humanity (Detwiler 1990, Ansell-Pearson 1994, Appel 1999, Hatab 2002). 
Through its commitment to equality, liberal democracy reduces exceptionality to 
commonality and wages a ‘joint war on everything rare, strange, privileged, on the higher 
man, higher soul, higher duty, higher responsibility, on creative power and mastery’ 
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(BGE 212). It is antithetical to the characteristics of a noble age – ‘the rift between 
people, between classes, the myriad number of types, the will to be yourself, to stand out’ 
and the ‘pathos of distance’ (TI Skirmishes, 37; compare GS 18). The ‘pathos of distance’ 
is an extremely important concept for Nietzsche. It represents the higher types’ feeling 
and understanding of their absolute superiority in contrast to the mediocre masses. It 
emerges from the ‘ingrained differences between stations, out of the way the ruling caste 
maintains an overview and keeps looking down on subservient types and tools, and out of 
this caste’s equally continuous exercise in obeying and commanding, in keeping away 
and below’ (BGE 257). The right of the ancient aristocrats ‘to create values and give 
these values names’ emerged precisely from this pathos. And future values can only be 
created if this pathos remains in place. 
Without this pathos, that other, more mysterious pathos could not have grown at 
all, that demand for new expansions of distance within the soul itself, the 
development of states that are increasingly high, rare, distant, tautly drawn and 
comprehensive, and in short, the enhancement of the type “man”, the constant 
“self-overcoming of man” (to use a moral formula in a supra-moral sense). 
(BGE 257) 
 
The necessity and definition of this pathos implies that the higher types are only able to 
create values if they have an inferior mass to look down on. The problem with 
Nietzsche’s argument is that it conflicts with his notion of aristocratic spontaneity. If the 
higher types require inferior subjects to look down on in order to create, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that aristocratic creation is ‘reactive’ rather than ‘active’. But 
reactivity is precisely that which defines ressentiment.37 To be sure, Nietzsche believes 
that the values created by the higher types are ‘active’, not ‘reactive’. It may be 
                                                
37
 See Chapter 1. 
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suggested, in response, that value is not created out of the contempt experienced by the 
higher types. Instead, the pathos of distance provides cognizance of distinction and 
differentiation that is then marked out psychologically and applied introspectively to 
values. Contempt can thus be felt for hitherto held values, facilitating the process of 
creating values. Values are thus not created from the contempt the higher type feels for 
the lower although this contempt contributes psychologically to the process of creating 
values. 
This suggestion is, of course, conjecture. Nietzsche does not fully explicate how 
the pathos of distance is to be reconciled with noble spontaneity.38 Nevertheless, without 
a pathos of distance higher types will be unable to create new values. And without these 
new values, society will descend into decadence. For Nietzsche, the higher types are 
responsible for legislating new values, even for the masses. ‘Not being at all accustomed 
to positing values, the only value the base person attributes to himself is the one his 
masters have attributed to him (creating values is the true right of masters)’ (BGE 261). 
Put differently, philosophers are ‘the ones who first determine the “where to?” and “what 
for?” of people’ (BGE 211). According to this argument, equality is fundamentally 
detrimental to a society’s health. It levels down the higher types and reduces them to 
level of mediocrity rather than assists in their ascendancy. ‘Equal rights’ is misguided 
when individuals are clearly unequal. 
It could be argued that Nietzsche is simply mistaken. Democracy does not level 
individuals down because the equality it endorses is merely formal or procedural. 
Equality, in this sense, does not strip away individual peculiarities. Neither does it negate 
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 I have always felt troubled by this inconsistency. Geuss acknowledges the same problem and does not 
think that Nietzsche provides us with an adequate solution. See (Geuss 1997, p.18). 
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the unique qualities and special talents of certain individuals. It acknowledges that 
individuals have different aptitudes, abilities and capacities and does not attempt to 
remove these distinctions. Procedural democracy, it may be said, argues only that the 
‘terms of participation in democratic procedures should themselves be fair’ and that 
‘persons are to be regarded as equals citizens’ (Beitz 1990, 23).
39
 Individuals are 
considered equal before the law but remain unequal in other qualitative and quantitative 
aspects. Nietzsche has confused procedural equality with an equalizing effect on ability. 
Individuals of exceptional ability can still flourish in a democratic environment.   
This critique of Nietzsche’s argument is nonetheless problematic. Equality as 
Nietzsche understands it is a ‘system through which the lowest natures prescribe 
themselves as laws for the higher’ (WP 862). It is through the mechanism of equality that 
normative values designed with the mediocre in mind are imposed on higher individuals 
who require different norms in order to flourish. ‘The good of the majority and the good 
of the minority are conflicting moral stand-points’ (GM I, 17n). Individuals may be equal 
before the law, but the law reflects the values of the herd by virtue of their strength in 
numbers. Equality makes numerical advantage politically meaningful. Furthermore, the 
higher types develop themselves through non-conventional norms that will surely violate 
the norms of the herd, invariably leading to censure. Because everyone possesses equal 
rights, exceptional individuals will certainly fail to have their values protected when 
challenged by the majority (See also Z II, 7).  
Moreover, procedural democracy does not adequately address the issue of pathos 
of distance. According to Nietzsche, equality results in ‘a certain factual increase in 
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 This does not suggest that procedural democracy is without controversy. But for our present purposes, 
this broad definition is sufficient. See the rest of Beitz’s work for a helpful discussion on this subject. 
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similarity that the theory of equal rights only gives expression to’ and ‘essentially 
belongs to decline’ (TI Skirmishes, 37 Emphasis Added). Nietzsche believes, it seems, 
that equality will gradually lead to a degree of conformity and uniformity that 
extinguishes individual distinctions. An age is strong only if it is characterized by a 
pathos of distance, a quality severely lacking in all political arrangements premised on 
equality.  
Defenders of procedural democracy could undoubtedly challenge the rejoinder 
that equality results in the imposition of herd norms and the abolition of the pathos of 
distance. For example, procedural democracy regards individuals as equal before the law 
and does not constrain psychological or emotional attitudes. It is entirely possible to 
experience contempt for most of one’s fellow citizens while acknowledging their 
formally equal status. To put it differently, equality does not – and can not – demand that 
we not feel contempt for others. It simply regards individuals as equal before the law. 
But even if we accept the proceduralist argument – that Nietzsche has simply 
misunderstood democratic equality – as true and concede that it is possible to reconcile 
equality and expressions of individual superiority, I believe there is another explanation 
for Nietzsche’s condemnation of equality. Just as morality abolishes the foundations 
necessary for human excellence, equality too thwarts one crucial condition – slavery. For 
Nietzsche, slavery is necessary for the development of human excellence. (Procedural) 
equality thwarts the possibility of accepting slavery as a necessary condition of social 
life. Equality understands individuals as ends; Nietzsche understands the majority as a 
means to a cultural end. 
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Nietzsche asserts that ‘every enhancement so far in the type “man” has been the work of 
an aristocratic society and that is how it will be, again and again, since this sort of society 
believes in a long ladder of rank order and value distinctions between men, and in some 
sense needs slavery’ (BGE 257). In a similar vein, he writes that: 
The essential feature of a good, healthy aristocracy is that it does not feel that it 
is a function (whether of the kingdom or of the community) but instead feels 
itself to be the meaning and highest justification (of the kingdom or community), 
– and, consequently, that it accepts in good conscience the sacrifice of countless 
people who have to be pushed down and shrunk into incomplete human beings, 
into slaves, into tools, all for the sake of the aristocracy. Its fundamental belief 
must always be that society cannot exist for the sake of society, but only as the 
substructure and framework for raising an exceptional type of being up to its 
higher duty and to a higher state of being. (BGE 258) 
 
A higher culture and slavery are inseparable for Nietzsche. Strikingly, these ‘mature’ 
views resonate with ideas found in his some of his earliest writings. In The Greek State, a 
posthumously published essay written between 1871 to 1872, Nietzsche argues that ‘in 
order for there to be a broad, deep, fertile soil for the development of art, the 
overwhelming majority has to be slavishly subjected to life’s necessity in the service of 
the minority, beyond the measure that is necessary for the individual’ (TGS, p.178). The 
surplus value created by the majority who are subjected to life’s necessity (labour for 
survival) will free persons of exceptional talent from the need to engage in similar 
activities. This allows them to concentrate on creating values and producing works of art 
and culture.
40
 It is impossible ‘for man, fighting for sheer survival, to be an artist’. As 
Nietzsche describes it, ‘at their [the majority’s] expense, through their extra work, that 
privileged class is to be removed from the struggle for existence, in order to produce and 
satisfy a new world of necessities’ (TGS, 177, 178). 
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 Nietzsche defines culture as ‘a real hunger (or need) for art’ (TGS, p.178). 
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In The Gay Science, Nietzsche observes that working for the sake of wages is a 
condition common to all civilized nations. Regarding work as a means to financial ends 
may be acceptable to the masses but it offends the taste of the exceptions. These ‘rare 
individuals’, who consist of ‘artists and contemplative men of all kinds’ would ‘rather 
perish than work without taking pleasure in their work … and have no use for ample 
rewards if the work is not itself the reward of rewards’ (GS 42). Even the threat of 
impecuniousness provides no incentive to engage in meaningless and alienating labour.  
The industrial culture that defines the modern age is considered by Nietzsche to 
be ‘altogether the most vulgar form of existence that has ever been’ (GS 40). Underlying 
this industrial culture is the ‘law of need’ which compels individuals to sell their labour 
in exchange for subsistence. Those who ‘exploit this need and buy the worker’ are 
despised by those who are constrained to sell themselves. In a statement that should not 
be read as countenancing socialism,
41
 Nietzsche claims that ‘the worker usually sees in 
the employer only a cunning, bloodsucking dog of a man who speculates on all distress 
and whose name, figure, manner, and reputation are completely indifferent to him’ (GS 
40). Interestingly, he observes that ‘submission to powerful, frightening, yes, terrifying 
persons, to tyrants and generals, is experienced to be not nearly as distressing as this 
submission to unknown and uninteresting persons’ (GS 40). 
The implication here is that the masses remain, in a sense, enslaved even in an 
industrial culture. ‘The worker is not free to choose whether he works, nor how he works’ 
(WS 286). Most individuals in modern capitalist societies work simply for the sake of 
monetary reward and do not derive satisfaction from their vocation. There are, of course, 
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Marx’s work. See (Marx 1844).!
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some who do obtain pleasure through employment, but they are surely in the minority. 
Nietzsche’s point is not, however, that socialism should replace an industrial culture. The 
aim of his discussion is to explain how socialism arises. He indicates that ‘the masses are 
basically prepared to submit to any kind of slavery provided that the superiors constantly 
legitimize themselves as higher, as born to command – through refined demeanour’. But 
sensing that ‘refinement cannot be improvised’ and witnessing the lack of ‘higher 
demeanour’ in the industrial elite, they believe it is ‘only accident and luck that elevated 
one above the other’ in this culture (GS 40). And this turns them towards socialism. 
The relationship between liberalism, socialism, the industrial culture and 
democracy could be stated more lucidly. Nietzsche identifies the historical ‘development 
of philosophical liberalism’ as intertwined with ‘economic liberalism (laissez-faire 
capitalism)’ (Ansell-Pearson 1994, 10). Liberalism is therefore closely associated with 
the industrial culture of the modern era, which he also defines as a ‘self-seeking, stateless 
money aristocracy’ (TGS 184). The paradox of liberalism lies in its belief in an 
expressive individualism on the one hand and its subsistence labour requirements on the 
other. Conversely, socialism seeks to emancipate the masses from the alienating and 
exploitative circumstances engendered by this industrial culture. Liberalism and 
socialism are both, however, predicated on the idea of equality. And from this shared 
premise, it may be said that they both belong to the ‘democratic movement’ as Nietzsche 
conceived it (BGE 44, 202, 203; compare WP 752-753; see also Ansell-Pearson 1991, 
212-214). 
Because modern politics has transferred authority to the masses, it is now ‘the 
slave who determines general views: in which capacity he naturally has to label all his 
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circumstances with deceptive names in order to be able to live’. Notions like ‘the dignity 
of man’ and the ‘dignity of work’ are ‘the feeble products of slavery that hides from 
itself’ (TGS 177). Nietzsche describes the modern political condition in greater detail: 
Ill-fated seducers who have destroyed the slave’s state of innocence with the 
fruit of the tree of knowledge! Now he must console himself from one day to the 
next with transparent lies the like of which anyone with deeper insight would 
recognize in the alleged ‘equal rights for all’ or the ‘fundamental rights of man’, 
of man as such, or in the dignity of work. He must be prevented at any cost from 
realizing what stage or level must be attained before ‘dignity’ can even be 
mentioned, which is actually the point where the individual completely 
transcends himself and no longer has to procreate and work in the service of the 
continuation of his individual life. (TGS 177) 
 
For Nietzsche, the democratic movement has disrupted the hierarchical 
organization of society by falsely suggesting that individuals are equal. The radical 
individualism that results from this movement is antithetical to cultural development. By 
calling the status and rights of the masses into question, liberalism and socialism have 
contributed to the abolition of the conditions necessary for the emergence of human 
excellence.  
What is stupid … is that there is a labour question at all. Certain things should 
not be called into question … I have no idea what people intend to do with 
European workers now that they have been called into question … All hope is 
gone for developing a group of modest and self-sufficient types … We did 
everything possible to nip even the prerequisites for this move in the bud, – the 
instincts that let workers find their level, that let workers be themselves, have 
been smashed to the ground by the most irresponsible negligence. Workers were 
enlisted for the military, they were given the right to organize, the political right 
to vote: is it any wonder that workers today feel their existence to be desperate 
(expressed morally – to be an injustice)? But what do people want? We ask once 
more: what do they will? If you will an end, you have to will the means too: if 
you want slaves, then it is stupid to train them to be masters. (TI Skirmishes, 40; 
see also WP 866) 
 
There are, then, two reasons why Nietzsche assails the democratic movement. The first 
reason is that equality dissolves distinctions between individuals and eliminates the 
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pathos of distance. Without this pathos the higher individuals are unable to engage in 
creative activity. The second reason is that the democratic movement abolishes the 
instrumental role of the masses by furnishing them with inapposite notions of equality 
and rights. The masses provide the means – through their labour – for the higher types to 
develop themselves. As Nietzsche remarks, ‘the specific hue which nobility had in the 
ancient world is absent in ours because the ancient slave is absent from our sensibility’ 
(GS 18). 
This said, Nietzsche does appear to support the democratic movement. In his 
written notes of 1885, he argues that ‘the same conditions that hasten the evolution of the 
herd animal also hasten the evolution of the leader animal’ (WP 956; see also WP 955) 
and endorses ‘the development and maturing of democratic institutions’ for ‘they 
enhance the weakness of the will’ (WP 132). Similarly, in 1887, he writes that ‘the 
dwarfing of man [democratic leveling] must for a long time count as the only goal; 
because a broad foundation has first to be created so that a stronger species of man can 
stand upon it’ (WP 890).  
Likewise, between the months of March and June of 1888, he notes that ‘a high 
culture can stand only upon a broad base, upon a strong and healthy consolidated 
mediocrity’ where the ‘honorable term for mediocre is, of course, the word “liberal”’ 
(WP 864). And in his clearest indication of support for the democratic movement, 
Nietzsche writes that ‘the leveling out of European man is the great process which cannot 
be impeded: it should be speeded up even further. As soon as it is achieved, this leveled 
species requires justification: that justification is the service of a higher, sovereign type 
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which stands upon it and can only rise to its own task from that position’ (LNB 9[153]; 
WP 898). 
These themes are all, in various ways and in various degrees, reiterated in Beyond 
Good and Evil. In this work, Nietzsche remarks: 
The same new conditions that generally lead to a leveling and mediocritization 
of man  - a useful, industrious, abundantly serviceable, and able herd animal 
man – are to the highest degree suitable for giving rise to exceptional people 
who possess the most dangerous and attractive qualities … considering the fact 
that the overall impression of such future Europeans will probably be of 
exceedingly garrulous, impotent and eminently employable workers who need 
masters and commanders like they need their daily bread; and, finally, 
considering the fact that Europe’s democratization amounts to the creation of a 
type prepared for slavery in the most subtle sense: taking all this into account, 
the strong person will need, in particular and exceptional cases, to get stronger 
and richer than he has perhaps ever been so far … the democratization of Europe 
is at the same time an involuntary exercise in the breeding of tyrants – 
understanding that word in every sense, including the most spiritual.  
 
Nietzsche appears, then, to be both highly critical and supportive of democracy. A 
straightforward resolution to this inconsistency lies in distinguishing between democracy 
as a means and democracy as an end. It is clear from these passages that Nietzsche does 
not consent to a democratic political framework as an organizational end. Democracy is 
valuable insofar as it creates an intelligent and obedient base on which the higher types 
may develop culture.  
To put it differently, democracy ought not to persist indefinitely but must give 
way to an aristocratic form of social organization. It has instrumental value in 
contributing to the emergence and development of a new form of aristocracy but is, on its 
own, meretricious and detrimental to the advancement of human excellence. In short, 
Nietzsche does not extol democracy as a political system. Instead, he commends it for its 
effects of creating a compliant majority that may be utilized by a naturally superior 
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individual for the purposes of cultural enhancement.
42
 As Nietzsche describes it, 
‘mediocrity is needed before there can be exceptions: it is the condition for a high 
culture’ (AC 57). 
It must be emphasized that Nietzsche is not wholly opposed to equality. Rather, 
he disputes universalizing it. In Twilight of the Idols, he remarks: ‘“Equality for the 
equal, inequality for the unequal” – that is what justice would really say: along with its 
corollary, “never make the unequal equal”’ (TI Skirmishes, 48). Elsewhere, he argues that 
‘mutually refraining from injury, violence, and exploitation, placing your will on par with 
the other’s: in a certain, crude sense, these practices can become good manners between 
individuals when the right conditions are present (namely, that the individuals have 
genuinely similar quantities of force and measures of value, and belong together within a 
single body)’ (BGE 259). And in that same work, he asserts that a noble soul ‘admits to 
itself, under certain circumstances (that at first give it pause), that there are others with 
rights equal to its own’ and ‘as soon as it is clear about this question of rank, it will move 
among these equals and “equally righted” with an assured modesty and a gentle 
reverence equal to how it treats itself’ (BGE 265). For Nietzsche, individuals are 
naturally unequal. Establishing a doctrine of universal equality despite massive 
inequalities is simply absurd. There are, however, individuals who have ‘genuinely 
similar quantities of forces and measures of value’ and it is only when equality is 
instituted amongst equals that the true demands of justice are met.    
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 As Nietzsche writes, for example, a ‘higher kind of man’ will ‘employ democratic Europe as their most 
pliant and supple instrument for getting hold of the destinies of the earth, so as to work as artists upon 
“man” himself. Enough: the time is coming when politics will have a different meaning’ (WP 960). 
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Despite sanctioning a hierarchical society predicated not only on inequality but 
also on a measure of slavery, Nietzsche consistently emphasizes the value of justice. In 
The Wanderer and His Shadow, he distinguishes morality from the ‘individual virtues’ of 
‘moderation, justice’ and ‘repose of soul’ (WS 212). In a similar vein, his discussion of 
practical history reveals justice as ‘the rarest of all virtues’ and claims that ‘no one has a 
greater claim to our veneration than he who possesses the drive to and strength for 
justice’ for ‘the highest and rarest virtues are united and concealed in justice’ (HL 6). 
What is interesting is that Nietzsche connects the idea of ‘equality for equals and 
inequality for unequals’ with justice. He argues that ‘no poison is more poisonous’ than 
the ‘doctrine of [universal] equality’ for although it appears ‘as if justice itself is 
preaching here’, it is in truth ‘the end of justice’ (TI Skirmishes, 48; see also Z II, 7). 
‘Justice (fairness)’, Nietzsche observes, ‘originates between parties of approximately 
equal power … where there is no clearly recognizable superiority of force and a contest 
would result in mutual injury producing no decisive outcome the idea arises of coming to 
an understanding and negotiating over one another’s demands’ (HAH I, 92). What 
follows from this is that ‘the characteristic of exchange is the original characteristic of 
justice’ and it is ‘thus requital and exchange under the presupposition of an 
approximately equal power position’ (HAH I, 92).  
Nietzsche’s point is that justice can be dissociated from morality and 
ressentiment. It ‘ultimately achieve[s] the opposite of what revenge sets out to do, which 
just sees and regards as valid the injured party’s point of view’ (GM II, 11). It aims at 
impartiality and trains ‘the eye … for an evermore impersonal interpretation of the 




 it can arise only between two equal powers. More importantly, once it is 
recognized that individuals are in fact unequal, impartiality must regard universal 
equality as inherently unjust. As Zarathustra vehemently declares, ‘for thus justice speaks 
to me: “humans are not equal”’ (Z II, 7). 
Making the principle of ‘mutually refraining from injury, violence, and 
exploitation, placing your will on par with the other’s’ the ‘fundamental principle of 
society … immediately shows itself for what it is: the will to negate life, the principle of 
disintegration and decay’ (BGE 259). Nietzsche impels us to dismiss ‘any sentimental 
weakness’ that may prejudice the acknowledgement that ‘life itself is essentially a 
process of appropriating, injuring, overpowering the alien and the weaker, oppressing, 
being harsh, imposing your own form, incorporating, and at least, the very least, 
exploiting’ (BGE 259; see also GM II, 11). Life, according to Nietzsche, ‘is precisely will 
to power’. For this reason, it ‘will want to grow, spread, grab’ and ‘win dominance, - not 
out of any morality or immorality, but because it is alive’. Exploitation does not therefore 
‘belong to a corrupted or imperfect primitive society: it belongs to the essence of being 
alive as a fundamental organic function; it is a result of genuine will to power, which is 
just the will of life’ (BGE 259). Understood in this way, democracy and its corresponding 
declaration of universal equality inevitably thwarts the basic expression of life.  
Nietzsche’s understanding of freedom explains further his criticism of non-
aristocratic politics. According to Nietzsche, freedom is  
Having the will to be responsible for yourself. Maintaining the distance that 
divides us. Becoming indifferent to hardship, cruelty, deprivation, even to life. 
Being ready to sacrifice people for your cause, yourself included. Freedom 
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 It is almost impossible to achieve impartiality. All view points are in some way impartial. The matter is 
one of degree.  
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means that the manly instincts which take pleasure in war and victory have 
gained control of other instincts, over the instinct of “happiness”, for instance. 
(TI Skirmishes, 38)  
 
Freedom is measured ‘by the resistance that needs to be overcome, by the effort that it 
costs to stay on top’. The ‘highest type of free human beings’ are found ‘where the 
highest resistance is constantly being overcome: five paces away from tyranny, right on 
the threshold, where servitude is a danger’ (TI Skirmishes, 38; see also WP 770). In 
specifically criticizing liberalism, Nietzsche argues that it furnishes society with 
conditions that are inimical to the requisites of freedom. Resistance and the prospect of 
servitude are wholly absent from a liberal political culture. For Nietzsche, ‘peoples with 
any value at all became valuable … not through liberal institutions’ but through ‘great 
danger’. Great danger compels us to become strong, makes us aware of ‘our resources, 
our virtues, our arms and weapons, our spirit’ and transforms a people ‘into something 
deserving of respect’ (TI Skirmishes, 38).  Nietzsche acknowledges that the ‘war for 
liberal institutions’ is indeed a ‘powerful promoter of freedom’. But ‘liberal institutions 
stop being liberal as soon as they have been attained: after that, nothing damages freedom 
more terribly or more thoroughly than liberal institutions’ (TI Skirmishes, 38). Once 
liberal institutions are established, freedom is no longer fought for and everyone is 
routinely in possession of it. But freedom is realized in the struggle for liberty rather than 
existing within a liberal society. If freedom is measured by the resistance that needs to be 
overcome, liberalism, which removes all forms of resistance, invariably results in the 
abolition of the conditions necessary for freedom.  
Moreover, Nietzsche thinks that ‘independence is an issue that concerns very few 
people: - it is a prerogative of the strong’ (BGE 29). It is not a substantive condition 
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applicable to or achievable by all. Democratic and liberal institutions are thus premised 
on empty notions of (universal) freedom and independence when these conditions are in 
fact beyond the reach of most persons. When freedom and independence are properly 
grasped as the exclusive preserve of higher human types, social order will invariably turn 
towards hierarchy and differentiation.   
Nietzsche’s understanding of freedom and justice can be explained with greater 
clarity by contrasting it with Kant’s.
44
 For Kant, all individuals possess an innate right of 
freedom – the independence to pursue self-determined ends without ‘being constrained 
by another’s choice’ insofar as this freedom is able to coexist ‘with the freedom of every 
other in accordance with a universal law’ because of their humanity (MM, §6:239). To 
think of others as persons requires that they not be ‘valued merely as a means to the ends 
of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in itself.’ The individual ‘possesses a 
dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other 
rational beings in the world.’ And his innate right of humanity is ‘the object of respect 
which he can demand from every other human being’ (MM; §6:435). To put it 
differently, persons are owed respect and must therefore be treated non-instrumentally. 
As Kant writes: 
Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow human 
beings and is in turn bound to respect every other … But just as he cannot give 
himself away for any price (this would conflict with his duty of self-esteem), so 
neither can he act contrary to the equally necessary self-esteem of others, as 
human beings, that is, he is under obligation to acknowledge, in a practical way, 
the dignity of humanity in every other human being. Hence there rests on him a 
duty regarding the respect that must be shown to every other human being. 
(MM, §6:462) 
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In developing his concept of right, Kant suggests that right ‘entails the authority 
to use coercion’ (MM, §6:232). He explains this argument by stating that any opposition 
to the ‘hindrance of an effect’ aids in its advancement and must therefore be ‘consonant 
with it’. According to universal law, that which opposes right is regarded as an 
‘hindrance to freedom’. Coercion is explained as being incompatible with freedom. But 
applying coercion to acts that serve as a hindrance to freedom will in fact promote 
freedom according to the argument that the opposition to the hindrance of an effect 
actually promotes that effect. In short, coercion applied to the hindrance of freedom ‘will 
be a hindrance to the hindrance of freedom, and will thus be consonant with freedom in 
accordance with universal laws – that is, it will be right’ (MM, §6:232). 
The Kantian principle of respect is clearly missing in Nietzsche’s philosophy. 
Unlike Kant, who not only regards every human being as an end but also considers each 
as having a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow human being, Nietzsche views 
most human beings as a means for the few higher types. And unlike Kant, who 
understands dignity as an inviolable inner worth that every person possesses by virtue of 
his humanity, Nietzsche sees the masses as lacking in ‘any essential dignity or worth’ 
(Kaufmann, 150). Nietzsche is also fundamentally opposed to Kant’s idea of justice as 
coercion applied to acts that hinder freedom, where freedom is conceived as the innate 
right of all persons. But more importantly, Nietzsche is against Kant’s universalizing of 
moral demands.  
A virtue needs to be our own invention, our own most personal need and self-
defence: in any other sense, a virtue is just dangerous. Whatever is not a 
condition for life harms it: a virtue that comes exclusively from a feeling of 
respect for the concept of “virtue”, as Kant would have it, is harmful. “Virtue”, 
“duty”, “goodness in itself”, goodness that has been stamped with the character 
of the impersonal and universally valid – these are fantasies and manifestations 
of decline … The most basic laws of preservation and growth require the 
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opposite: that everyone should invent his own virtues, his own categorical 
imperatives. A people is destroyed when it confuses its own duty with the 
concept of duty in general. Nothing ruins us more profoundly or inwardly than 
“impersonal duty” … To think that people did not sense the mortal danger posed 
by Kant’s categorical imperative! (AC 11). 
 
It is clear, then, that Nietzsche opposes liberal and democratic institutions. Less clear are 
his ideas on the nature of a superior political system. In what follows, I discuss 
Nietzsche’s political system and argue that it is a system fraught with ambiguity.   
  
The Question of Nietzsche’s Political System 
 
Nietzsche adumbrates a vision of an aristocratic society without addressing the 
inner workings of such a system. It has been demonstrated that his aristocratic system is 
predicated on slavery and has the production of higher culture as its goal. But the 
architecture of this system remains unclear. On occasions, Nietzsche suggests that the 
normative values of the masses should continue to be authoritative for them. He argues, 
for example, that his ‘philosophy aims at an ordering of rank’ and that ‘the ideas of the 
herd should rule in the herd – but not reach out beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a 
fundamentally different valuation for their own actions’ (WP 287). In a similar vein, he 
notes that ‘there are truths best known by mediocre minds, because they are best suited to 
mediocre minds’ (BGE 253) and that different classes of individuals have their ‘own 
feelings of perfection’ (AC 57). Likewise, he asserts in the Genealogy of Morality that 
herd values display the ‘prudence of the lowest order’ (GM I, 13). But if the herd is to be 
governed by its own normative agenda premised on ideas of universal equality and 
freedom, it seems impossible to establish a social order advocating hierarchy or slavery. 
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This ambiguity is exacerbated by Nietzsche’s equivocation over the relationship 
between the higher and lower types. In the Anti-Christ he asserts that ‘the weak and 
failures should perish … And they should be helped to do this’ (AC 2). This theme is 
reiterated in another work when he claims that modern values have resulted in the 
preservation of ‘too much of what should be destroyed’ (BGE 62). Yet he argues later in 
the Anti-Christ that when ‘an exceptional person treats a mediocre one more delicately 
than he treats himself and his equals, this is not just courtesy of the heart, - it is his duty’ 
(AC 57). Elsewhere, he argues that ‘hatred for the mediocrity is unworthy of a 
philosopher: it is almost a question mark against his “right to philosophy.” Precisely 
because he is an exception he has to take the rule under his protection, he has to keep the 
mediocre in good heart’ (WP 893). And although ‘the church has always wanted to 
destroy its enemies’, the higher types have learnt to appreciate the value of having 
enemies and believe that they ‘benefit from the existence of the church’ (TI Morality, 3).  
Furthermore, the higher types are sometimes regarded as legislators tasked with 
the responsibility of moulding society; at other times they are excluded from all forms of 
social rule. It appears, then, that Nietzsche equivocates on matters of social order. I do 
believe, however, that it is possible to present a more coherent account of how 
Nietzsche’s political ideas interact with one another. Clarifying the implications of his 
political ideas should not be mistaken as an elucidation of their prescriptive potential. As 
I have said, Nietzsche’s political comments should be read as part of his diagnosis of 
modern cultural decline. But clarifying his political comments will aid reflections on the 
weaknesses of contemporary politics as identified by Nietzsche. I will begin with its 
structure.  
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Nietzsche provides his most detailed exposition of his aristocratic order in The 
Anti-Christ. Here, Nietzsche argues that nature works at differentiating humanity into 
‘three mutually conditioning physiological types’ that ‘separate out and gravitate in 
different directions, each one having its own hygiene, its own area of work, its own 
feelings of perfection and field of mastery’ (AC 57). The highest caste comprises of the 
most spiritual of individuals, who, ‘being the strongest, find their happiness where other 
people would find their downfall: in labyrinths, in harshness towards themselves and 
towards others, in trials’. These individuals ‘take pleasure in self-overcoming’ and 
‘asceticism is their nature, requirement’ and ‘instinct’ (AC 57). They rule not out of 
desire but ‘because they exist’. Individuals of ‘muscular and temperamental strength’ 
make up the second caste. Not only are they ‘the custodians of the law, the guardians of 
order and security’ but they also serve as the ‘executives of the most spiritual people’ and 
‘take over everything crude in the work of ruling’ (AC 57). The final and lowest caste is 
made up of the mediocre. For them, ‘mediocrity is a happiness; mastery of one thing, 
specialization as a natural instinct. It would be completely unworthy of a more profound 
spirit to have any objection to mediocrity as such’ (AC 57).  
This account is perfectly compatible with Nietzsche’s earlier claim that ‘the 
highest men live beyond the rulers, freed from all bonds; and in the rulers they have their 
instruments’ (WP 998). As mentioned, Nietzsche regards the second caste as the 
executives of the spiritual elites. As executives, they govern the daily affairs of the state 
and are tasked with everything crude in ruling. That is, they are involved in formal 
political governance and can be said to ‘rule’ in this way. Significantly, Nietzsche refers 
to their highest exemplar as ‘king’ (AC 57), which implies political authority.  
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This reading may be said to be problematic. Nietzsche remarks elsewhere that the 
highest types are to be involved in the molding of society.  In a note written between 
1885 and 1886, he writes that ‘higher kind of man’ will ‘employ democratic Europe as 
their most pliant and supple instrument for getting hold of the destinies of the earth, so as 
to work as artists upon “man” himself. Enough: the time is coming when politics will 
have a different meaning’ (WP 960, Emphasis Added). In Ecce Homo, he adds that for 
Zarathustra, people ‘are something unformed, matter, an ugly stone that needs a sculptor’ 
(EH Z, 8). This point is illustrated in his literary masterpiece when Zarathustra proclaims: 
But I am always driven anew to human beings by my ardent will to create; thus 
the hammer is driven toward the stone.  
Oh you human beings, in the stone sleeps an image, the image of my images! A 
shame it must sleep in the hardest, ugliest stone! 
Now my hammer rages cruelly against its prison. Shards shower from the stone: 
what do I care? 
I want to perfect it. 
 
I do not, however, think that these statements challenge those made in the Anti-Christ. In 
fact, I regard them as compatible. The highest types may mould society like a sculptor 
does with stone, but this does not imply crude political governance. The philosopher-
artists are tasked with creating new values but it is their executives who will carry out the 
actual translation and execution of these values into politically relevant initiatives if 
required. Furthermore, it is necessary to distinguish between cultural and political 
authority. For Nietzsche, politics is instrumental to the demands of culture. As such, 
political authority is to be placed in the service of cultural development. Even if it is not 
required that the newly created values be transformed into politically meaningful 
outcomes, values can still hold transfigurative power. It is possible to mould a people 
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through creative legislation without engaging directly in executive duties. It is also 
possible to mould a people without engaging in traditional forms of politics.  
Returning to Zarathustra’s proclamation reveals an interesting aside. Zarathustra’s 
hammer rages cruelly against the stone and shards shower from it. Yet he does not care 
for he wants to perfect it. This resonates with the common interpretation that Nietzsche’s 
aristocracy involves a measure of cruelty. His claims that slavery is necessary and that 
the higher types will be harsh towards themselves and to others imply as much (AC 57; 
see also BGE 257-259). But Nietzsche does say that slavery must be understood ‘in the 
most subtle sense’ (BGE 242).  
Moreover, our understanding of cruelty must be divorced from moral influence if 
we are to avoid misunderstanding Nietzsche. In the Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes defines 
cruelty as ‘contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others’ that proceeds ‘from security 
of’ one’s ‘own fortune’ (L I, 6). This definition is merely descriptive and is without moral 
undertones or connotations. It is appropriate, I think, to ground Nietzsche’s claims of 
cruelty on this definition for two reasons. First, Nietzsche dismisses moral valuations and 
attempts to go beyond them. Any definition of cruelty should therefore be without moral 
implication. Second, Nietzsche does not advocate that ‘men should take pleasure in other 
mens great harmes, without other end of his own’ (L I, 6 Emphasis added) but only that 
cruelty is a necessary feature of all great developments of human excellence. This 
conception of cruelty is implicitly expressed in the following note: 
To remain objective, hard, firm, severe in carrying through an idea – artists 
succeed best in this; but when one needs men for this (as teachers, statesmen, etc., 
do), then the repose and coldness and hardness soon vanish. With natures like 
Caesar and Napoleon, one gets some notion of “disinterested” work on their 
marble, whatever the cost in men. On this road lies the future of the highest men: 
to bear the greatest responsibility and not collapse under it. – Hitherto, the 
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delusions of inspiration were almost always needed in order not to lose one’s faith 
in one’s right and one’s hand. (WP 975) 
 
This quote also brings us back to the problem of pity. Pity becomes a political problem 
when those who rule are unable to bear the great responsibility of molding society at the 
cost of people. Rulers must be able to rage cruelly against the stone without collapsing 
under the weight of this duty. To put it differently, the highest men must be indifferent to 
the calamity of others and not care when ‘shards shower from the stone’ as it is struck. 
Pity is politicized and made problematic when it interferes with the act of ruling 
according to necessity for the sake of perfection.  
There remains the question of whether the highest types create values for the 
masses or if the herd remains ruled by those of its own. This question cannot be answered 
definitively but I believe the higher types do create values for the masses. For example, 
Nietzsche remarks that ‘the only value the base person attributes to himself is the one his 
masters have attributed to him (creating values is the true right of masters)’ (BGE 261). 
In a similar vein, he notes that philosophers are ‘the ones who first determine the “where 
to?” and “what for?” of people’ (BGE 211).  
These comments are however in conflict with others which suggest that the 
masses should be governed by their own values. A way out of this impasse lies in 
understanding that the elite may legislate new values that are designed with the masses in 
mind.  
Every choice human being strives instinctively for a citadel and secrecy where he 
is rescued from the crowds, the many, the vast majority; where, as the exception, 
he can forget the human norm. The only exception is when he is driven straight 
towards this norm by an even stronger instinct, in search of knowledge in the 
great and exceptional sense … he [the exception] would eventually have to say 
to himself: “To hell with good taste! The norm is more interesting than the 
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exception – than me, the exception!” – and he would wend his way downwards, 




The exception’s wending of his way downwards finds its analogue in Zarathustra’s 
descent from the mountains. It has been observed that Zarathustra regards humanity as an 
ugly stone in need of a sculptor. It must be noted that the exception must engage in a 
‘long and serious study of the average man’ (BGE 26). If the exceptions do not create 
new values for the masses, it is questionable why they must descend and study the 
masses. 
More importantly, Nietzsche consistently warns us that exceptional values are 
poison to the weak. Creating values that are fundamentally injurious to the weak cannot 
be designed for the masses. If the suggestion that the higher types do legislate, in part, 
with the masses in mind, the new values must be appropriate for the herd. This does not 
mean that the higher types only create values with the weak in mind. But it does imply 
that they create new values for a wide range of human types, taking into account the 
attributes of each type when legislating for each. These new herd values could certainly 
accommodate the needs of cultural development. A new herd value could be acceptance 
of one’s instrumental role in the service of examples of human excellence (although this 
might not count as new for Nietzsche does think that the masses are always prepared for 
slavery as long as the right individual is present).  
Nevertheless, Nietzsche considers political and cultural ends to be irreconcilable.  
                                                
45
 This idea is also found in Daybreak. Here Nietzsche writes that anyone who finds the rule ‘more 
interesting than the exception’ is ‘far advanced in the realm of knowledge and is among the initiated’ (D 
442). However, this quote does not have a wider context within which one can interpret it and it is not clear 
if this refers specifically to people. The rule could also apply to other fields of inquiry where there are 
norms and exceptions.  
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If you invest all your energy in economics, world commerce, 
parliamentarianism, military engagements, power and power politics, - if you 
take the quantum of intelligence, seriousness, will, and self-overcoming that you 
embody and expend it all in this one direction, then there won’t be any left for 
the other direction. Culture and the state – let us be honest with ourselves here – 
these are adversaries: ‘Kultur-Staat’ is just a modern idea. The one lives off the 
other, the one flourishes at the expense of the other. All the great ages of culture 
have been ages of political decline: anything great in the cultural sense is 
apolitical, even anti-political. – Goethe’s heart leapt up at the phenomenon of 
Napoleon, - it sank back down with the ‘Wars of Liberation’ (TI Germans, 4) 
 
This explains Nietzsche’s declaration in The Gay Science, where he writes: 
We ‘conserve’ nothing; neither do we want to return to any past; we are by no 
means ‘liberal’; we are not working for ‘progress’; we don’t need to plug our ears 
to the market-place’s sirens of the future: what they sing – ‘equal rights’, ‘free 
society’, ‘no more masters and no servants’ – has no allure for us. We hold it 
absolutely undesirable that a realm of justice and concord should be established on 
earth (because it would certainly be the realm of the most profound leveling down 
to mediocrity and chinoiserie); we are delighted by all who love, as we do, danger, 
war, and adventure, who refuse to compromise, to be captured, to reconcile, to be 
castrated; we consider ourselves conquerors; we contemplate the necessity for new 
orders as well as for a new slavery – for every strengthening and enhancement of 
the human type also involves a new kind of enslavement. (GS 377) 
 
Clearly then, Nietzsche’s political thought is neither liberal nor democratic. It is 
fundamentally opposed to the ideas of equality and abolition of suffering and is better 
thought of as aristocratic. Understanding his arguments for aristocracy does, however, 
















This thesis has explained Nietzsche’s political ideas as a diagnosis of the cultural 
ills of modern civilization. Even his aristocratic comments, which have often been read 
prescriptively, are read here as a part of that diagnosis.  Doing so makes sense as 
Nietzsche provides no textual detail to support the idea that his political statements 
should be understood as prescriptive. To be sure, Nietzsche does intend to effect 
attitudinal shifts through his philosophy. But an attitudinal change is fundamentally 
different from providing political recommendations that are to be used and understood 
prescriptively.  
Commentary on Nietzsche’s political thought remains deeply controversial. For 
authors like Kaufmann and Bergmann, Nietzsche is anti-political, although their positions 
are grounded differently. Kaufmann argues that the ‘leitmotif of Nietzsche’s life and 
thought’ is fundamentally ‘the theme of the antipolitical individual who seeks self-
perfection far from the modern world’ while Bergmann suggests that Nietzsche’s anti-
political self-references must be understood within the historical context of his time. For 
Bergmann, the term ‘anti-political’ referred to anything that brought into question the 
autonomy of politics. In a sense, this view has turned out to be correct, so long as it is not 
taken to mean that Nietzsche did not think politics was important. By reducing political 
to an instrument of culture, Nietzsche was surely entitled to regard himself as anti-
political.  
Others authors like Leiter and Brobjer argue that Nietzsche is not a political 
thinker at all. Leiter, for instance, argues that Nietzsche was simply not interested in 
politics although his philosophical views do indeed have certain political implications. He 
insists, however, that calling Nietzsche a political thinker is a mistake. In a different vein, 
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Nussbaum claims that Nietzsche regarded himself as a great political thinker but argues 
that Nietzsche fails to fit the criteria she defines as necessary to qualify as a political 
thinker.  
Finally there are those who regard Nietzsche as political though they disagree 
over the nature of his politics. Some regard him as an aristocrat while others believe his 
philosophy to be compatible with liberal democratic ideas. Still others regarded him as a 
supporter of nationalism despite his clear objections to nationalist projects.  
In a sense, this is a semantic debate only. Whether or not Nietzsche is a political 
thinker, his comments on politics are significant enough to warrant consideration. I have 
avoided appropriating his politics to support any ideological position but have instead 
explained his comments as they appear. This said, it is clear that Nietzsche repudiates the 
ideas of liberalism, socialism and democracy but favours an aristocratic social 
arrangement. My thesis attempts to explain why he made such comments.  
I believe Nietzsche’s political ideas bear a deep relationship to his critique of 
traditional morality and associated traditions. He asserts, on occasion, that modern 
politics is the offshoot of Christian morality. It is therefore important to study his critique 
of morality if we are to understand more fully his political ideas.  
In chapter 1, I examined his critique of morality. I began with a study of the 
genealogical approach and Nietzsche’s genealogy of morality. According to Nietzsche, 
aristocratic valuations are grounded in feelings of strength. They are active in the sense 
that these valuations arise spontaneously. The aristocratic distinction between good and 
bad merely reflected their amoral designation of self and plebeian. Everything unlike 
them was considered to be weak and bad but this had no moral undertones whatsoever. 
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Christian morality, on the other hand, grew out of ressentiment. It is only able to affirm 
itself by disparaging that which is unlike itself and is therefore considered to be reactive.   
A genealogical examination of Christianity was then pursued. For Nietzsche, 
Christianity represents a series of interpretations of pre-existing normative behaviour and 
customs. Jesus’ himself interpreted a more basic custom but rather than create a set of 
principles from this interpretation, Jesus lived his interpretation instead. Christianity 
should therefore be understood as a practice rather than a ritualistic tradition 
encompassing dogmatic principles. That Christianity became an institutionalized 
ritualistic performance was because of Paul. Paul’s interpretation of Jesus’ life was so 
fundamentally flawed that it represented its antithesis. In fact, this interpretation was so 
erroneous and injurious that Nietzsche regarded it as an invention. It transformed 
Christianity from practice to institution and dogma. Nietzsche praises Jesus’ life and 
Christianity as a practice because it embodies living in full accordance with one’s 
principles. He severely censures Paul for destroying the sanctity of the Christian tradition.  
I then proceeded to examine Nietzsche’s reasons for repudiating traditional 
morality. Following Leiter, I argued that Nietzsche rejects morality because it abolishes 
the fundamental conditions necessary for the development of human excellence. For 
Nietzsche, great suffering and harsh circumstances are crucial for the cultivation of 
strength. But morality seeks to abolish and destroy these conditions and is therefore a 
hindrance to cultural enhancement.  
To illustrate this point, I examined Nietzsche’s critique of pity. According to 
Nietzsche, pity causes an individual to lose strength. It makes the pitier susceptible to 
harm from those seeking pity and endows them with the power to hurt. Conversely, 
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receiving pity is considered to be insulting according to noble valuations. To offer pity is 
to strip away the pitied’s sense of dignity and self-respect. Pity also furnishes the pitier 
with the ability to control the pitied. By offering assistance out of pity, one is able to 
amass power over the object of pity by creating a feeling of indebtedness in the pitied.   
Pity not only destroys an individual self-reliance, it also abolishes conditions of 
suffering. In effect, it removes the conditions necessary for the development of the higher 
individual. The corollary of this is that Nietzsche repudiates traditional morality for 
eliminating the possibilities for the enhancement of humanity.  
The thesis then examined Nietzsche’s political ideas. I began Chapter 2 by 
demonstrating Nietzsche’s connection of politics with traditional morality. Following 
this, I explained the essence of Nietzsche’s philosophy, which provided a context for 
understanding his political comments. In his opinion, modern humanity has killed God. 
The death of God symbolizes not only that belief in God is no longer sustainable but that 
the foundations of our values can no longer support our beliefs. Because our normative 
values are predicated on the idea of God, his death has resulted in the loss of their 
justifications. Furthermore, because our values outside morality are also deeply related to 
and grounded on God, his death eliminates their justification as well. Although largely 
responsible for the death of God, science cannot take his place because it first needs a 
value-ideal, a value-creating power to serve and therefore justify itself. 
The collapse of our Christian approach to the world results in nihilism. Nihilism is 
the condition where the highest values devalue themselves and questions seeking 
resolution find no answers. But Nietzsche also argues that nihilism arises from 
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Christianity itself. Christianity causes nihilism because it focuses on the afterlife instead 
of the present. As such, it is essentially life negating. 
Politics is unable to create the values needed to replace those that have been 
exposed to be hollow and empty. It cannot offer itself as a solution to modern problems. 
Redeeming ourselves from our metaphysical and theological delusions and nihilism 
requires higher individuals. Humanity’s task, according to Nietzsche, is to aid in the 
development of these higher individuals. In privileging cultural development, Nietzsche 
reduces politics to instrumentality. 
Nietzsche criticizes democratic politics precisely because it cannot act as a means 
for the development of human excellence. He assails it for the leveling effects it has on 
humanity and for thwarting the imposition of slavery. For Nietzsche, a higher culture and 
slavery are inseparable.  Democracy also removes the pathos of distance which he 
regards as fundamental to the development of these higher types. The pathos of distance 
expresses the higher types’ cognizance of their absolute superiority in contrast to the 
mediocre.  But he also praises democracy for fostering the conditions necessary for these 
higher types to emerge. The leveling effects of democracy acts as a foundation for the 
higher types to create new values and produce culture. 
Nietzsche then criticizes liberalism for hindering freedom. Freedom is 
experienced and attained only through struggle. The fight for liberalism is an expression 
of this freedom, but once liberal institutions are attained, freedom is lost. Individuals no 
longer need to fight for their liberty and are not placed in circumstances of great danger 
or resistance – conditions necessary for persons to attain freedom.  
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Nietzsche also asserts that justice demands inequality. He grounds this on the fact 
that individuals are, by nature, unequal. If justice is impartial, it must concede that it is 
only fair that unequals are treated unequally. As such, democratic institutions are, for 
Nietzsche, fundamentally unjust.  
Finally, this thesis examined Nietzsche’s political system. It is readily admitted 
that Nietzsche’s political comments are extremely ambiguous. He does not provide us 
with a detailed exposition on the inner workings of his argument. To clarify this 
ambiguity, I argued that Nietzsche holds that aristocratic arrangements naturally consist 
of three classes. The spiritual class rules by virtue of its existence and its role is to create 
values. The strong form the second class and they act as executives to the highest types. 
And the third class is the masses Nietzsche equivocates over the highest types’ 
involvement in governance. I argue that they do not participate in the actual political 
governance of society but rule indirectly through the legislation of values. They are able 
to shape society through these values without having to engage in political rule.  
It was also argued that Nietzsche does think that the higher types do create values 
for the herd. Despite claiming that the herd values should rule in the herd, he does state 
on occasion that the herd depends on masters for their values. Furthermore, it makes no 
sense to say that the same herd values should continue to rule given Nietzsche’s concern 
with nihilism. This does not mean that the higher types only create values with the weak 
in mind. But it does imply that they create new values for a wide range of human types, 
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